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Abstract
Over the years, many different agent programming languages have been proposed. In this paper,
we propose a concept called Agent Programs using which, the way an agent should act in various
situations can be declaratively specified by the creator of that agent. Agent Programs may be built on
top of arbitrary pieces of software code and may be used to specify what an agent is obliged to do,
what an agent may do, and what an agent may not do. In this paper, we define several successively
more sophisticated and epistemically satisfying declarative semantics for agent programs. We further
show that agent programs cleanly extend well understood semantics for logic programs, and thus
are clearly linked to existing results on logic programming and nonmonotonic reasoning. Ó 1999
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1. Introduction
Over the last few years, there has been intense work in the area of intelligent agents
[50,106]. Applications of such agent technology have ranged from intelligent news and
mail filtering programs [63], to agents that monitor the state of the stock market and
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(a) IMPACT architecture (b) IMPACT agent architecture
Fig. 1. Architecture of IMPACT system.
detect trends in stock prices, to intelligent web search agents [34], to the digital battlefield
where agent technology closely monitors and merges information gathered from multiple
heterogeneous information sources [4,57,58,95,104].
In the long run, a platform to support the creation and deployment of multiple software
agents will need to inter-operate with a wide variety of custom-made, as well as legacy
software sources. Any definition Def of what it takes for a software package S (in any
programming language) to be considered an agent program, must come accompanied with
tools to augment, modify, or massage S into an agent according to the definition Def.
Fig. 1 shows the architecture of our IMPACT system for the creation and deployment
of multiple interacting agents. IMPACT is a joint project between the University of
Maryland, Bar-Ilan University (Israel), the Technical University of Vienna (Austria), and
the University of Koblenz (Germany). In IMPACT, an agent consists of two parts:
(1) A body of software code (built in any programming language) that supports a well
defined application programmer interface (either part of the code itself, or developed
to augment the code). In general, we will assume that a piece of software S is
represented by a pair S = (TS ,FS) where:
– TS is the set of all data types manipulated by the software package S . TS is
assumed to be closed under sub-types, i.e., if τ is a subtype of a type in TS , then
τ must also be in TS .
– FS is the set of all pre-defined functions of the package S that are provided by
the package’s application programmer interface.
In other words, in the strict sense of object systems, S is definable as a collection (or
hierarchy) of object classes in any standard object data management language such as
ODL [21]. Almost all existing servers used in real systems, as well as most commercial
packages available on the market are instances of the above definition.
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For example, consider the well known Oracle DBMS. This may be viewed as a body of
software code S = (TS,FS) where:
– TS consists of the following types: a set of attribute domains, tuples over different
combinations of these attribute domains, and relations (sets of tuples) over different
attribute domains.
– FS consists of the classical relational operations: select, project, Cartesian product,
join, union, intersection, difference and aggregate operations, together with combina-
tions of these.
At any given point t in time, the state of an agent will refer to a set OS(t) of objects
from the types TS , managed by its internal software code. An agent may change its state
by taking an action—either triggered internally or by processing a message received from
another agent. However, one agent cannot directly change another agent’s state, though it
might do so indirectly by shipping the other agent a message issuing a change request. The
precise definitions of messages and message management, as well as actions and action
management, will be described in detail below.
(2) A semantic wrapper that contains a wealth of semantic information. Such informa-
tion includes, but is not restricted to the following:
(a) A service description expressed in some tightly specified language. While a
multiplicity of languages may be used for this purpose, in IMPACT [5] we
have developed an HTML-like language for creating and manipulating service
descriptions. This language has been characterized with a formal declarative
semantics, as well as sound and complete algorithms for matching requests for
services with an archive of service descriptions. Such matches are “correct” only
with respect to an underlying similarity measure.
(b) A message manager that manages the data structures associated with an
IMPACT agent’s mailbox, and specifies and implements policies on how
commonalities between requests may be exploited to reduce the load on the
agent.
(c) An action module that will take as input, a newly read message (which will
constitute an event), and use this to trigger zero, one, or many actions. For this
purpose, the action module will require a specification of:
(i) (Action base) the actions that the agent may take in principle, and
the conditions that the agent state must satisfy for these actions to be
executable, as well as the effects on the agent state of taking such actions;
(ii) (Action requirements) the conditions (on the agent state) under which the
agent is either obliged or forbidden to take certain actions, as well as the
conditions under which an agent is permitted (at its discretion) to take an
action;
(iii) (Action policy) the conditions on the agent state that determine how to
choose which of several permissible actions should in fact be executed.
(d) A metaknowledge module that provides the agent valuable information both
about itself, as well as about other existing agents in the world. Such
metaknowledge may include statistical information on the reliability of other
agents, the speeds with which other agents provided certain services, and the
financial charges (if any) levied for such transactions. It may also include
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self-knowledge—such self-knowledge may include statistics about its own
performance, as well as analyzes of operations on which it has performed well
or badly. The metaknowledge module is described in a separate paper [30].
The IMPACT architecture contains a set of replicated, mirrored IMPACT servers that
provide a variety of services. Such services include agent yellow-page location services
(to find agents that provide a requested service), an agent ontology service, as well as
type/thesaurus services. The locations of all mirrored replicas of the IMPACT servers are
known to all agents—mirroring and replication guarantee that the system infrastructure
will survive “downtimes” experienced by one or more servers. A synchronization layer
guarantees that different IMPACT servers will reflect the same state, propagating changes
at one server to other mirrored sites. Due to space concerns, the reader interested in details
of the IMPACT architecture is referred to [5].
With this background in mind, we are now ready to go into the main aim of this paper—
which is to design a theory and implementation of methods by which an agent may decide
what actions it is obligated to take in a given state, what actions it is permitted to take (in
a given state), and how it chooses which actions to in fact perform, given such a state of
the world. Such choices are expressed by an agent program developed in a logical agent
programming language that we introduce in this paper. We are not the first to propose
agent programming paradigms—several others, notably Shoham [92], Hindriks et al. [49]
and Griacomo et al. [43], have done so before us. Our work builds upon these previous,
pioneering efforts, in the following ways:
(1) We will formally define the concept of an Agent Program that allows agents (of the
sort described above) to be built on top of arbitrary software code with application
programmer interfaces.
(2) We will show that using such Agent Programs, we can access legacy software as
well as custom built software.
(3) We will provide several alternative declarative semantics specifying the meaning
of such Agent Programs. In particular, this declarative semantics will specify what
actions an agent will perform, given a currently prevailing agent state, and how the
execution of these actions will modify the agent state.
(4) We will establish relationships between some of these semantics and existing
semantical characterizations of nonmonotonic logic programs.
The concept of Agent Programs described here has led so far to the development of
two applications—the first builds a simulation of a supply chain management example,
facilitating interoperation between database agents and route planning and scheduling
agents. This application involves specifically building agents on top of commercial
software packages including Microsoft ACCESS and ESRI’s MapObjects. The second
application describes a multiagent solution to the “Controlled Flight into Terrain” (CFIT)
Problem that is the single largest cause of airline fatalities in the world. Our CFIT
multiagent application includes flight planning agents, terrain elevation agents, and GPS
(Global Positioning System) agents. In this paper, we restrict to consider the following
plain example.
Example (Tax Scenario). Consider a tax agency to determine which returns to audit. Tax
agencies are usually required to follow some explicit rules in who to audit (so that tax
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officers cannot audit ex-spouses against whom they hold a grudge, or unfairly prosecute
one or another racial/ethnic group, etc.).
A simple tax application may in fact have several agents. For the sake of simplicity, we
will consider just one agent, which we shall call the Audit-Agent that determines which
users should be audited. It may do so by monitoring two relations:
– The first relation, called returns, contains a relational representation of the returns
filed by tax-payers.
– The second relation, called employer_decs, specifies the payments to various
individuals that have been reported by employers.
The agent monitors discrepancies between the amounts reported by individual taxpayers,
and amounts reported by all employers who have made payments to that person. Based on
these discrepancies, it may either be obliged to take some audit actions, or forbidden to do
so, or permitted to do so at its discretion. Based on the actions this agent takes, it may be
forced to take other actions (such as notifying the taxpayer that he is required to explain
his return, or to appear in person in tax court, etc.).
This scenario is a simplified scenario, that permits pedagogical clarity when it is used
to illustrate the theories and definitions introduced in this paper. We will use this example
repeatedly in this paper.
The present paper is the first in a series of papers—Part II of this series [31] will develop
results on the computational cost of these alternative semantics, giving rise to a hierarchy
of increasing complexity. It will also include algorithms for computing these alternative
semantics.
The organization of Part I is as follows. Section 2 specifies how agent reasoning may be
built on top of existing legacy software and how this may be used to define the concept of
an agent state. Section 3 specifies the language within which agent actions are specified,
and the language of agent programs which specifies the conditions governing an agent’s
behavior. Section 4 addresses why the framework we propose is useful. The subsequent
Section 5 forms the main contribution of this paper, and describes the semantics of agent
programs. In fact, Section 5 gives a set of successively more desirable semantics to agent
programs. We discuss the advantages and disadvantages of these semantics, and shows the
relationship between our semantics and well-known semantics in logic programming. As
the relationship between logic program semantics and nonmonotonic reasoning semantics
(for default logic, autoepistemic logic and truth maintenance systems) is well known, this
section also shows the relationship between our semantics and classical nonmonotonic
logic semantics. In Section 6 we review related work and compare our Agent Programs to
various other systems for agent based programming. Section 7 closes this paper and gives
some outlook to future work.
Note. As this paper is long and contains a fair amount of notation, Appendix C contains
a table summarizing the notation, as a handy reference for the reader. Proofs of technical
results have been moved to Appendices A and B, in order not to distract from the flow of
reading.
184 T. Eiter et al. / Artificial Intelligence 108 (1999) 179–255
2. Software code access
In this section, we focus on the “internal” data managed by the software code underlying
an agent. As mentioned in the Introduction, we may characterize the code implementing
an agent to be a pair S = (TS ,FS), where TS is the set of all data types provided by S and
FS is a set of predefined functions S which makes access to the data objects in the agent’s
state OS available to external processes.
This characterization of a piece of software code is a well accepted and widely used
specification—for example, the Object Data Management Group’s ODMG standard [21]
and the COBRA framework are existing industry standards that are consistent with this
specification.
2.1. Code calls and code call atoms
In this section, we introduce the reader to the important concept of a code call
atom—this concept forms the basic syntactic object using which we may access multiple
heterogeneous data sources. Before proceeding to this definition, we need to introduce
some syntactic assumptions.
The content of Section 2.1 is not new work. It builds upon a previous effort called
HERMES by one of the authors on heterogeneous data and software integration [1,20,
61,62,64]. The reader familiar with that syntax may skip this section.
Suppose we consider a body S = (TS ,FS) of software code. Given any type τ ∈ TS ,
we will assume that there is a set Var(τ ) of variable symbols ranging over τ . If X ∈ Var(τ )
is such a variable symbol, and if τ is a complex record type having fields f1, . . . ,fn, then
we require that X.fi be a variable of type τi where τi is the type of field fi. In the same
vein, if fi itself has a sub-field g of type γ , then X.fi.g is a variable of type γ , and so
on. In such a case, we will call X a root variable, and the variables X.fi, X.fi.g, etc. path
variables. For any path variable Y of the form X.path, where X is a root variable, we refer
to X as the root of Y, denoted by root(Y); for technical convenience, root(X), where X is a
root variable, refers to itself.
An assignment of objects to the variables is a set of equations of the form V1 = o1, . . . ,
Vk = ok, where the Vi’s are variables (root or path) and the oi’s are objects—such an
assignment is legal if the types of objects and corresponding variables match.
Definition 2.1 (Code call). Suppose S = (TS ,FS) is some software code and f ∈ F is
a predefined function with n arguments, and d1, . . . ,dn are objects or variables such that
each di respects the type requirements of the i’th argument of f. Then S : f(d1, . . . ,dn)
is called a code call. A code call is ground, if all the di’s are objects.
In general, as we will see later, code calls are executable when they are ground. Thus,
nonground code calls must be “instantiated” prior to attempts to execute them.
In general, each function f ∈ F has a signature, specifying the types of inputs it takes,
and the types of outputs it returns. Here are some examples of code calls that we have
implemented:
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– oracle : select(emp.rel,salary,>,150000).
Consider a domain called oracle representing the Oracle Universal Server. One
of the relations in such a database may be called emp.rel. The above code call
executes a select operation on the emp.rel table, and returns as output, the set of all
tuples in emp.rel whose salary field is over 150,000 (dollars).
– face : match(mugshotdb,queryface).
Consider a domain called face implementing a face recognition program. This
program may manage a mugshot archive called mugshotdb of individuals whose
identities are known. The match function takes a picture of someone whose identity
is to be determined, and matches it against the mugshot database, returning a ranked
set of pairs (File,Name), of faces and associated names that match the query face.
– terrain:planroute(map1,97,97,102,103).
Consider a domain called terrain representing a terrain reasoning system. map1
may be one of several maps in this system. The function planroute plans an op-
timal route (according to some trafficability criteria we will not go into here) from a
given origin to a given destination. The above code call asks the terrain reasoner to
plan an optimal route from the point (97, 97) on map1 to the point (102, 103) on
map1.
Assumption. We will assume that the output signature of any code call is a set. There is no
loss of generality in making this assumption—if a function does not return a set, but rather
returns an atomic value, then that value can be coerced into a set anyway—by treating the
value as shorthand for the singleton set containing just the value.
Definition 2.2 (Code call atom). If cc is a code call, and X is either a variable symbol, or
an object of the output type of cc, then in(X,cc) is a code call atom.
Code call atoms, when evaluated, return Boolean values (i.e., they may be thought of as
special types of logical atoms [91]). Intuitively, a code call atom succeeds just in case X is
in the result set returned by cc (when X is an object), or when X can be made to point to
one of the objects returned by executing the code call. Let us return to the code calls we
introduced earlier, and see examples of some code call atoms.
– in(X,oracle:select(emp.rel,salary,>,150000)).
Here, this code call atom would succeed, instantiating X to any single tuple in relation
emp that has a salary field of over 150,000.
– in(X,face:match(mugshotdb,queryface)).
This code call atom would succeed, instantiating X to any record R (having a
file and name fields) whose R.file image matches the queryface image as
determined by the image processing code implementing the match operation.
– in(X,terrain:planroute(map1,97,97,102,103)).
This code call atom would succeed, instantiating X to some optimal route (as deemed
by the route planner code) between points (97, 97) and (102, 103).
Definition 2.3 (Code call condition). A code call condition is defined as follows:
(1) Every code call atom is a code call condition.
186 T. Eiter et al. / Artificial Intelligence 108 (1999) 179–255
(2) If s,t are either variables or objects, then s= t is a code call condition.
(3) If s,t are either integers/real valued objects, or are variables over the integers/reals,
then s< t,s> t,s> t,s6 t are code call conditions.
(4) If χ1,χ2 are code call conditions, then χ1 &χ2 is a code call condition.
A code call condition satisfying any of the first three criteria above is an atomic code call
condition.
An example of a code call condition is:
in(X,oracle:select(emp.rel,salary,>,150000))&
in(Y,face:findpictureof(mugshotdb,X.name)) (1)
This condition may be viewed as a query requesting that we find all X,Y such that X is
a person who makes over 150 K (as determined by querying an Oracle relation called
emp.rel), and finding all pictures Y of such a person from the mugshot database.
One aspect to keep in mind about code calls is that while code call syntax allows
variables to appear in a code call, it is usually impossible to evaluate a code call when
it has uninstantiated variables.
Most commercial packages’ application programmer interface functions assume that
when the functions are invoked, all arguments expected by that function will be passed,
else an error will result. However, it is possible to write code call conditions that expect
functions defined in external packages to work even when some arguments are not
instantiated. The concept of safety defined below ensures that this cannot happen.
Definition 2.4 (Safe code call). A code call S : f(d1, . . . ,dn) is safe if and only if each
di is ground. A code call condition χ1 & · · ·&χn, n> 1, is safe if and only if there exists
a permutation pi of χ1, . . . , χn such that for every i = 1, . . . , n the following holds:
(1) If χpi(i) is a comparison s1 ops2, then
(1.1) at least one of s1,s2 is a constant or a variable X such that root(X) belongs
to
RVpi(i)= {root(Y) | ∃j < i s.t. Y occurs in χpi(j)};
(1.2) if si is neither a constant nor a variable X such that root(X) ∈ RVpi(i), then
si is a root variable.
(2) If χpi(i) is a code call atom of the form in(Xpi(i),ccpi(i)), then the root of each
variable Y occurring in ccpi(i) belongs to RVpi(i), and either Xpi(i) is a root variable,
or root(Xpi(i)) is from RVpi(i).
Intuitively, a code call is safe, if we can reorder the code call atoms occurring in it in
a way such that we can evaluate these atoms left to right, assuming that root variables are
incrementally bound to objects.
For example, the code call condition in(X,S1 : f1(a,Y)) is not safe because it
requires the function f1 to be executed on two arguments, one of which is not instantiated.
On the other hand, the code call condition in(X,S1 : f1(a,Y))&in(Y,S2 : f2(b))
is safe, because we can execute the code call atom in(Y,S2 : f2(b)) to obtain a ground
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binding θ for Y and then execute in(X,S1 : f1(a,Yθ)). Similarly, the code call (1)
described earlier in this section is safe. However, the code call
in(X,oracle:select(emp.rel,salary,>,150000))&
in(Y,face:findpictureof(mugshotdb,Z.name))
is not safe. The reason is that if the ordering of code call atoms above is used, then the
face database is looking for an instantiated argument, Z.name, which it does not find. The
reader can easily ascertain that reordering the literals in the example does not establish the
safety property either.
As we will see later when defining actions, given a code call condition χ , it may
be useful to talk about whether χ is safe if we assume that certain variables in χ are
instantiated. Consider the code call condition in(X,S1 : f1(a,Y)) given above. If we
know that Y will be bound to a constant (i.e., an object) (but do not know what this constant
is), then we can certainly say that this code call condition is safe modulo the assumption
that Y is bound. The following definition captures this.
Definition 2.5 (Safety modulo variables). SupposeX is a set of variables and χ is a code
call condition. Let χ ′ be the result of replacing all occurrences of variables inX by objects
from an arbitrary legal assignment to them. Then, χ is said to be safe modulo the variables
in X if and only if the code call condition χ ′ is safe.
We are now ready to define what constitutes a solution of a code call condition.
Definition 2.6 (Code call solution). Suppose χ is a code call condition involving the
variables EX, and S = (TS ,FS) is some software code. A solution of χ with respect to
TS in a state OS is a legal assignment of objects o to the variables X in EX, written as a
compound equation EX = Eo, such that the application of the assignment makes χ true in
state OS .
We denote by Sol(χ)TS ,OS (omitting subscripts OS and TS when clear from the
context), the set of all solutions of the code call condition χ in state OS , and
by O_Sol(χ)TS ,OS (where subscripts are occasionally omitted) the set of all objects
appearing in Sol(χ)TS ,OS .
For example, consider the Oracle/Face database code call discussed earlier. A valid
solution to this code call may be the assignment
X= JohnSmith, Y= john_smith.gif.
We are now ready to introduce an important assumption we make in our paper. As the
reader surely knows, most legacy programs that manipulate a certain data structure have
existing code to insert and delete objects from that data structure. This is certainly true
of most commercial relational DBMSs, geographic information systems (e.g., ArcInfo,
ArcView), spatial databases (quadtrees, R-trees), face databases (e.g., Informix face data
blade), scheduling systems (e.g., Microsoft Schedule), etc.
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Assumption. Throughout this paper, we assume that the set FS associated with a software
code package S contains two functions described below:
– A function insS , which takes as input a set of objectsO manipulated by S , and a state
OS , and returns a new state O′S = insS(O,OS) which accomplishes the insertion of
the objects in O into OS , i.e., insS is an insertion routine.
– A function delS , which takes as input a set of objectsO manipulated by S and a state
OS , and returns a new set of objectsO′S = delS(O,OS) which describes the deletion
of the objects in O from OS , i.e., delS is a deletion routine.
In the above two functions, it is possible to specify the first argument, O, through a code
call atom or a code call condition involving a single variable. Intuitively, suppose we ex-
ecute the function, insquadtree(χ[X]) where χ[X] is a code call involving the (sole) free
variableX. This may be interpreted as the statement: “Insert, using a quadtree insertion rou-
tine, all objects o such that χ[X] is true with respect to the current agent state when X= o”.
In such a case, the code call condition, χ is used to identify the objects to be inserted, and
the insquadtree function specifies the insertion routine to be used. Assuming the existence
of such insertion and deletion routines is very reasonable—almost all implementations of
data structures in computer science include insertion and deletion routines!
As a single agent program may manage multiple data types τ1, . . . , τn, each with its
own insertion routine, insτ1, . . . , insτn , respectively, it is often more convenient to associate
with any agent a, an insertion routine, insa , that exhibits the following behavior: given
either a set O of objects (or a code call condition χ[X] of the above type), insa(χ[X],OS)
is a generic method that selects which of the insertion routines insτi , associated with the
different data structures, should be invoked in order to accomplish the desired insertion.
A similar comment applies to deletion as well. Throughout the rest of this paper, we will
assume that an insertion function insa and a deletion function dela may be associated with
any agent a in this way. Where a is clear from context, we will drop the subscript.
At this point, we have briefly shown how the mechanism of code calls, and code call
atoms, provides a unified syntax within which different software packages and databases
may be accessed through their application programmer interfaces. All the above code call
mechanisms have been implemented by us.
Code calls, and code call atoms, form the basic theoretical mechanism through which
an agent may access its internal code. In addition, using the code call mechanism, an
agent A might send a request to agent B, with full assurance that agent B will be able to
execute what is being requested by agent A. The service description layer of the IMPACT
architecture will include descriptions of the code calls provided by each agent—this will
also be included in the Yellow Pages Server contained as part of the IMPACT Server. These
sources can be used by agent A to structure its code call message to agent B. We will not go
into the description of the service description component of IMPACT here—that is done
in a companion paper [5].
2.2. Integrity constraints
In addition to code calls, each agent also has an associated set of Integrity Constraints.
Agent integrity constraints specify properties that states of the agent must satisfy. For
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example, if we have an Oracle agent maintaining an employee database, we may have
an integrity constraint of the form:
in(X,oracle : select(emp.rel,salary,>,100000))⇒ X.grade> 6.
This integrity constraint on the Oracle software states requires that the emp.rel relation
must always ensure that individuals with salaries over 100 K are at salary grade 6 or higher.
Similarly, consider an agent whose internal state is determined not just by one package,
but by a hybrid of two packages—a face recognition system and an image processor. Here,
we may want to use an integrity constraint which states that:
in(X,face:match(mugshotdb,queryface))&
in(Y,oracle:select(convicts.rel,name,=,X.name)&
=(X.sex,male)
⇒
in(X,face:match(mugshotdb_male,queryface)).
This constraint says that if X is returned by matching a query face using a face
recognition program, and we know that the person shown in X is a male convict (using
a relational database), then it should be the case that X is also returned by executing the
match on just male mugshots.
Definition 2.7 (Integrity constraint). An integrity constraint is an expression of the form
ψ⇒ χa
where ψ is a safe code call condition, and χa is an atomic code call condition such that
every root variable in χa occurs in ψ .
Note that the safety requirement on the precondition of an integrity constraint guarantees
a mechanism to evaluate the precondition of an integrity constraint whose head is
grounded.
Definition 2.8 (Integrity constraint satisfaction). A state OS satisfies an integrity con-
straint IC of the form ψ⇒ χa , denotedOS |= IC, if for every legal assignment of objects
from OS to the variables in IC, either ψ is false or χa is true.
Let IC be a (finite) collection of integrity constraints, and let OS be an agent state. We
say that OS satisfies IC, denoted OS |= IC, if OS satisfies every constraint IC ∈ IC.
3. Agent actions
Every agent’s actions are completely determined by three parameters that the individual
creating the agent must specify:
– An “action base” specifying a set of actions that the agent can execute (under the right
conditions).
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– A set of “action constraints” that specify, for example, mutual exclusion between
actions, etc.
– An “agent program” that determines which of the (instances of) actions in the agent
base the agent is obligated, permitted, or forbidden to execute, together with a
mechanism to actually determine what actions will be taken. Actions are triggered
by events. For example, reading a message may be an event that triggers one or more
actions. A clock-event (e.g., the clock reaching 08.00 hours) may be another event
that triggers another action.
In this section, we will introduce the concepts of action base, action constraint, and action
program, and discuss how they work together.
3.1. Action base
In this section, we will introduce the concept of an action and describe how the effects of
actions are implemented. In most work in AI [42,74,83] and logical approaches to action
[12], it is assumed that states are sets of ground logical atoms. In the fertile area of active
databases, it is assumed that states reflect the content of a relational database. However,
neither of these two approaches is adequate for our purpose because the state of an agent
which uses the software code S = (TS ,FS) is described by the setOS . The data objects in
OS could be logical atoms (as is assumed in most AI settings), or they could be relational
tuples (as is assumed in active databases), but in all likelihood, the objects manipulated by
S are much more complex, structured data types.
Definition 3.1 (Action; action atom). An action α consists of five components:
– a name, usually written α(X1, . . . ,Xn), where the Xi ’s are root variables;
– a schema, usually written as (τ1, . . . , τn), of types. Intuitively, this says that the
variable Xi must be of type τi , for all 16 i 6 n;
– a code call condition χ , called the precondition of the action, denoted by Pre(α);
– a set Add(α) of code call conditions;
– a set Del(α) of code call conditions.
The precondition Pre(α)must be safe modulo the variables X1, . . . ,Xn. Furthermore, every
code call condition χ in Add(α)∪Del(α)must be safe modulo the union of X1, . . . ,Xn and
the root variables Y1, . . . ,Ym occurring in Pre(α).
An action atom is a formula α(t1, . . . , tn), where ti is a term, i.e., an object or a variable,
of type τi , for all i = 1, . . . , n.
Let us now consider some examples of actions and their associated descriptions in
specific domains.
Example 3.1 (Simple Tax Audit Agent). Let us return to the tax agent scenario described
in Section 1. Suppose that the agent has some action
run_audit(Person).
This action might be executed by the agent if she runs an audit on a person. This action
maybe specified as follows:
– Name: run_audit(Person).
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– Schema: (Person), where Person is an object of type person (for simplicity,
identified with its name).
– Pre:
in(T,taxdb:select(returns,name,=,Person))
A record T for the person must be filed in relation returns.
– Add:
X.Name= T.Name&
X.Result = taxdb:eval_audit(T.Name) &
X.Date = system:today()
Here, the type of X is the domain of another relation audit in the tax database,
which stores an entry for each audit on a person which has been run, together with the
result—which is determined by a procedure eval_audit—and the date, which is
returned by a system function. Adding X includes this tuple in the relation audit. 3
– Delete: In this case, there is nothing to delete.
In our framework, we assume that any explicit state change initiated by an agent is
an action. For example, sending messages and reading messages is an action. Similarly,
making an update to an internal data structure is an action. Performing a computation on
the internal data structures of an agent is also an action (as the result of the computation in
most cases is returned by modifying the agent’s state).
Example 3.2 (Message Box). Throughout this paper, we will assume that each agent’s
associated software code includes a special type called msgbox (short for message box).
Each agent has its own personal instance of this data type, reflecting its personal mailbox. 4
The message box data structure is a buffer. When an agent receives a message or when
it instructs that a message be sent, then the buffer gets updated. When the agent reads
the message, or when a message is physically sent off, then the buffer gets flushed. We
assume the existence of an operating-systems level messaging protocol (e.g., sockets or
TCP/IP [105]) that can fill in (with incoming messages) or flush (when a message is
physically sent off) this buffer.
We will assume that the agent has the following functions that are integral in managing
this message box. Note that over the years, we expect a wide variety of messaging
languages to be developed (examples of such messaging languages include KQML [58]
at a high level, and remote procedure calls at a much lower level). In order to provide
maximal flexibility, we will merely specify below, the “core” interface functions available
3 Observe that, in general, membership of an object in a class could be made explicit through a special
“instance_of” attribute—which is common in object-oriented systems—that is specified in the condition. For
example, we could include then X.instance_of = ’audit’ in the above code call condition to stress
membership of X in the relation audit.
4 Unix’s mail daemons are implemented this way.
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on the msgbox type. Note that this set of functions may be augmented by the addition of
other functions on an agent by agent basis.
– SendMessage(Src,Dest,Msg): This causes a quintuple (o,Src,Dest,Msg,
Time) to be placed in msgbox. The o signifies an outgoing message. When
SendMessage(Src, Dest,Msg) is executed, the state of msgbox changes by
the insertion of the above quintuple denoting the sending of a message from the source
(Src) agent to a given destination agent (Dest) involving the message body Msg;
Time denotes the time at which the message was sent.
– GetMessage(Src): This causes a collection of quintuples (i,Src,agent-id,Msg,
Time) to be read from msgbox. The i signifies an incoming message. Note that all
messages from the given source to the agent agent-id whose message box is being
examined, are returned by this operation.Time denotes the time at which the message
was received.
– TimedGetMessage(op,Val): This causes the collection of all quintuples tup=
(i,Src,agent-id,Msg,Time) to be read from msgbox, where tup.TimeopVal holds;
op is required to be any of the standard comparison operators6,<,>,>,=.
Agents interact with the external world through the msgbox code—in particular,
external agents may update agent A’s msgbox, thus introducing new objects to agent A’s
state, and triggering state changes which are not triggered by agent A.
Throughout this paper, we will assume that every agent has as part of its state, the
specialized type msgbox defined here, together with the code calls on this type defined
here.
Example 3.3 (Java Agents). In today’s world, the word “agent” is often considered (in
certain non-AI communities) to be synonymous with the Java applets. What is unique
about an applet is that it is mobile. A Java applet hosted on machine H can “move” across
the network to a target machine T, and execute its operations there. The actions taken by a
Java agent agent-id, may be captured within our framework as follows.
(1) Name: do(Op,Host,Target,ArgumentList)
which says “Perform the operation Op on the list ArgumentList of arguments
located at the Target address by moving there from the Host address”.
(2) Precondition:
in(Host,java:location(agent-id))&
in(“ok”,security:authorize(agent-id,Op,Target,
ArgumentList).
This says that the Java implementation recognizes that the agent in question is
currently at the Host machine and that the security system of the remote machine
authorizes the agent to download itself on the target and execute its action.
(3) Add/Delete-Set: This consists of whatever insertions and deletions must be done to
data in the Host’s workspace.
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We are now ready to define an action base. Intuitively, each agent has an associated
action base, consisting of actions that it can perform on its object state.
Definition 3.2 (Action base). An action base, AB, is any finite collection of actions.
The above definition states what an action is, but allows the possibility that an action
should simultaneously add and and delete some object. Classical AI systems like STRIPS
also allow this to happen in the syntax (e.g., in a STRIPS rule, an atom could occur in both
the Add and Delete lists) and handle potential problems of this sort by first doing deletions
and then insertions. We mimic this as well. Later, in Section 3.1, we will show that it is
possible using a simple syntax to be introduced in Section 3.1 to forbid execution of any
action whose add and delete sets have an overlap.
A difference between our work and classical AI systems, is that in the latter, change
is modeled solely as the insertion and deletion of logical atoms from a state which is a
set of logical atoms [74]. In the real world, however, states are usually instances of fairly
complex data structures. Therefore, in our case, changes affect components of objects in
OS , where S is the software code manipulated by the agent in question. The following
definition shows what it means to execute an action in a given state.
Definition 3.3 ((θ, γ )-executability). Let α( EX) be an action, and let S = (TS ,FS) be an
underlying software code accessible to the agent. A ground instance α( EXθ) of α( EX) is
said to be executable in state OS , if and only if there exists a solution γ of Pre(α( EXθ))
with respect to OS . In this case, α( EX) is said to be (θ, γ )-executable in state OS , and
(α( EX), θ, γ ) is a feasible execution triple for OS . By FE(α( EX),OS) we denote the set of
all pairs (θ, γ ) such that (α( EX), θ, γ ) is a feasible execution triple in state OS .
Intuitively, in α( EX), the substitution θ causes all variables in EX to be grounded. However,
it is entirely possible that the precondition of α has occurrences of other free variables not
in EX. Appropriate ground values for these variables are given by solutions of Pre(α( EXθ))
with respect to the current stateOS . These variables can be viewed as “hidden parameters”
in the action specification, whose value is of less interest for an action to be executed.
The following definition tells us what the result of (θ, γ )-execution is.
Definition 3.4 (Action execution). Suppose (α( EX), θ, γ ) is a feasible execution triple in
state OS . Then the result of executing α( EX) with respect to (θ, γ ) is given by the state
apply((α( EX), θ, γ ),OS)= ins(Oadd,del(Odel,OS)),
where Oadd = O_Sol(Add(α( EXθγ ))) and Odel = O_Sol(Del(α( EXθγ ))); i.e., the state
which results if first all objects in solutions of call conditions from Del(α( EXθγ )) on OS
are removed, and then all objects in solutions of call conditions from Add(α( EXθγ )) onOS
are inserted.
We reiterate here that ins refers to the insertion routine associated with the agent whose
actions are being discussed above. The ins function may in turn call specific insertion
routines associated with each data structure manipulated by the agent in question.
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Furthermore, observe that in the above definition, we do not pay attention to integrity
constraints. Possible violation of such constraints due to the execution of an action will
be handled later in the definition of the semantics of agent programs that we are going to
develop, and will of course prevent that integrity-violating actions from being executed on
the current agent state.
While we have stated above what it means to execute a feasible execution triple on
an agent state OS , there remains the possibility that many different execution triples are
feasible on a given state, which may stem from different actions α( EX) and α( EX′), or even
from the same grounded action α( EXθ). Thus, in general, we have a set AS of feasible
execution triples which should be executed. It is natural to assume that AS is the set of
all feasible execution triples. However, it is perfectly imaginable that only a subset of all
feasible execution triples should be executed. For example, if only one from many solutions
γ is selected—in a well-defined way—such that (α( EX), θ, γ ) is feasible, for a grounded
action α( EX)θ ; we do not discuss this any further here.
Suppose then we wish to simultaneously execute a set of (not necessarily all) feasible
execution triples AS. There are many ways to define this. We present three possible
definitions below, and assess their merits and disadvantages.
Definition 3.5 (Weakly-concurrent execution). Suppose AS is a set of feasible execution
triples in the agent state OS . The weakly-concurrent execution of AS in OS , is defined to
be the agent state
apply(AS,OS)= ins(Oadd,del(Odel,OS)),
where
Oadd =
⋃
(α( EX),θ,γ )∈AS
O_Sol(Add(α( EXθγ ))),
Odel =
⋃
(α( EX),θ,γ )∈AS
O_Sol(Del(α( EXθγ ))).
For any set A of actions, the execution of A on OS is the execution of the set
AS= {(α( EX), θ, γ ) | α(Et) ∈A, α( EXθ)= α(Etθ) is ground, and (θ, γ ) ∈ FE(α( EX))}
of all feasible execution triples stemming from some grounded action in A, and
apply(A,OS) denotes the resulting state.
As the reader will note, this is a definition which does everything in parallel—it first does
all deletions and then all insertions. While weakly-concurrent executions work just fine
when the set A of actions involves no “conflicts”, they are problematic when the actions in
A compete for resources.
Example 3.4 (Grid). Suppose we have a two-dimensional grid and an object is placed at
location (5,7) on the grid, and suppose two actions go-right and go-left are both
possible. If we define go-right(X,Y) and go-left(X,Y) in the obvious way, then
on the execution of both go-left(5,7) and go-right(5,7), the final result says
that the object is at both locations (6,7) and (4,7) which is clearly absurd!
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Thus, before attempting to perform a weakly-concurrent execution of a set of actions,
we must ensure that the set of actions satisfy some consistency criteria, otherwise there is
a danger of doing something absurd.
The following definition, called sequential-concurrent execution (or S-concurrent
execution for short) removes some, but not all of these problems, and in turn, introduces
some new problem. In effect, it says that a set of actions is S-concurrently executable iff
there is some way of ordering the actions so that they can be sequentially executed.
Definition 3.6 (Sequential-concurrent executability). Suppose that we have a set AS =
{ti | ti = (αi( EXi), θi, γi),1 6 i 6 n} of feasible execution triples and an agent state OS .
Then, AS is said to be S-concurrently executable in state OS , if and only if there exists a
permutation pi of AS and a sequence of states O0S, . . . ,OnS such that:
– O0S =OS and
– for all 16 i 6 n, the action αpi(i)( EXpi(i)) is (θpi(i), γpi(i))-executable in the state Oi−1S ,
and OiS = apply(tpi(i),Oi−1S ).
In this case, AS is said to be pi -executable, and OnS is the final state resulting from the
execution AS[pi].
A set A of actions is S-concurrently executable on the agent state OS , if the set
AS= {(α( EX), θ, γ ) | α(Et) ∈ A, α( EXθ)= α(Etθ) is ground, and (θ, γ ) ∈ FE(α( EX))}
is S-concurrently executable on OS .
S-concurrent executions eliminate the problems of consistency that plague the weakly-
concurrent executions. For instance, in the go-right, go-left example above, if the
two moves are made one after the other, then the object ends up in one location, which is
in this case (5,7) (i.e., the original one). However, this also introduces two weaknesses:
– First, we would like to deterministically predict the result of executing a set of actions
concurrently. Weakly-concurrent executions allow such predictions, but S-concurrent
ones do not.
– Second, the problem of checking whether a set of feasible execution triples is S-
concurrently executable is NP-hard (see below), and the intractability shows up even
in very simple settings.
The notion of full-concurrent execution (F -concurrent execution given below), removes
the first of these problems, but not the second. It removes the first problem by saying that a
set of feasible execution triples is F -concurrently executable iff each and every sequence of
triples from this set is serially executable and the results of each of these serial executions
is identical.
Definition 3.7 (Full-concurrent executability). Suppose that we have a set AS= {ti | ti =
(αi( EXi), θi, γi),16 i 6 n} of feasible execution triples and an agent state OS . Then, AS is
said to be F -concurrently executable in state OS , if and only if the following holds:
(1) For every permutation pi , AS is pi -executable.
(2) For any two permutations pi1,pi2 of AS, the final states resulting from the executions
AS[pi1] and AS[pi2] are identical.
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A set A of actions is F -concurrently executable on the agent state OS , if the set
AS= {(α( EX), θ, γ ) | α(Et) ∈A, α( EXθ)= α(Etθ) is ground, and (θ, γ ) ∈ FE(α( EX))}
is F -concurrently executable on OS .
For instance, the go-right, go-left example from above is an F -concurrently
executable action set, since regardless in which order we execute the actions, we always
end up in the same location as moves on the grid commute. However, like S-concurrent
execution, F -concurrent execution also suffers from intractability.
The following result specifies the complexity of weakly-concurrent executability, S-
concurrent executability, and F -concurrent executability of a set of feasible execution
triples. In general, it shows that only weakly-concurrent executability is tractable, while
the other notions are intractable.
For deriving this result, we assume that we have a set of feasible execution triples AS to
be executed on a given state OS , such that following operations are possible in polynomial
time:
(1) testing whether the grounded precondition Pre(α( EXθγ )) for any triple (α( EX),
θ, γ ) ∈ AS is satisfied in an agent state;
(2) determining all objects in solutions of Add(α( EXθγ )) and in Del(α( EXθγ )) on an
agent state, as well as insertion/deletion of objects from an agent state;
(3) construction of all objects that may be involved in the state and intermediate states
evolving from execution of AS on OS under any permutation pi .
Such a setting applies, e.g., in the case where the agent state is a collection of ground facts,
which is maintained under the domain closure axiom.
The following result compares the computation complexity of the three different types
of concurrent execution we have introduced in this section. We notice that an epistemically
satisfying notion of concurrency (e.g., F -concurrency) is computationally expensive
compared to epistemically less desirable notions of concurrency.
Theorem 3.1. Let AS be a given set of feasible execution triples, and let OS be a given
object state. Then, under the previous assumptions, deciding whether AS is
– weakly-concurrently executable is polynomial;
– S-concurrently executable is NP-complete; and
– F -concurrently executable is co-NP-complete.
The polynomial time result for weakly-concurrent execution is immediate from the
assumptions that we made. The other results are proved in Appendix A. In fact, NP-
hardness (respectively, co-NP-hardness) is present already in a very simple and relevant
setting, in which the software package S is a relational database, and the actions insert and
delete tuples from tables, while the preconditions of actions are simple conjunctive queries.
3.2. Action constraints
As we have already seen in the preceding section, concurrent execution of multiple
actions is often difficult. An action constraint is an explicit statement saying that a given
set of actions is not concurrently executable if certain conditions are met.
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Definition 3.8 (Action constraint). An action constraint AC has the syntactic form:{
α1( EX1), . . . , αk( EXk)
}←↩ χ (2)
where α1( EX1), . . . , αk( EXk) are action names, and χ is a code call condition.
The above constraint says that if condition χ is true, then the actions α1( EX1), . . . , αk( EXk)
are not concurrently executable.
Example 3.5 (Grid continued). Returning to our simple go-left and go-right
actions on a grid, we may have an action constraint of the form:
{go_left(O1,X1, Y1),go_right(O2,X2, Y2)}←X1 − 1=X2 + 1 &Y1= Y2.
This says that two objects cannot be simultaneously moved onto the same grid location.
Definition 3.9 (Action constraint satisfaction). A set S of ground actions satisfies an
action constraint AC as in (2) on a state OS , denoted S,OS |= AC, if there is no legal
assignment θ of objects in OS to the variables in AC such that χθ is true and {α1( EXθ),
. . . , αk( EXθ)} ⊆ S holds (i.e., no concurrent execution of actions excluded by AC is included
in S). We say that S satisfies a setAC of actions constraints onOS , denoted S,OS |=AC,
if S,OS |= AC for every AC ∈AC.
Clearly, action constraint satisfaction is hereditary with respect to the set of actions
involved, i.e., S,OS |=AC implies that S′,OS |=AC, for every S′ ⊆ S.
The reader might notice that the action constraint in the previous example can also
be simulated by an integrity constraint which says that the agent state cannot allow
two objects to simultaneously occupy the same grid location. As we will see later in
Section 5.5, various action constraints can be simulated with the machinery already in
place. In particular, it will turn out that action constraints merely provide syntactic sugar
for operations that can be executed within our existing framework. Hence, we do not go
into further detail on them for now.
3.3. Agent programs: Syntax
So far, we have introduced the following important concepts:
– Software code calls—this provides a single framework within which the interopera-
tion of diverse pieces of software may be accomplished;
– Software states—this describes exactly what data objects are being managed by a
software package at a given point in time;
– Integrity constraints—this specifies exactly which software states are “valid” or
“legal”;
– Action base—this is a set of actions that an agent can physically execute (if the
preconditions of the action are satisfied by the software state);
– Action constraints—this specifies whether a certain set of actions is incompatible.
However, in general, an agent must have an associated “action” policy or action strategy.
In certain applications, an agent may be obliged to take certain actions when the agent’s
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state satisfies certain conditions. For example, an agent monitoring a nuclear power plant
may be obliged to execute a shutdown action when some dangerous conditions are
noticed. In other cases, an agent may be explicitly forbidden to take certain actions—for
instance, agents may be forbidden from satisfying requests for information on US advanced
air fighters from Libyan nationals.
In this section, we introduce the concept of Agent Programs—programs that specify
what an agent must do (in a given state), what an agent must not do, and what an agent is
permitted to do, and how the agent can actually select a set of actions to perform that honor
its permissions, obligations, and restrictions. Agent Programs are declarative in nature, and
have a rich semantics that will be discussed in Section 5.
Definition 3.10 (Action status atom). Suppose α(Et) is an action atom, where Et is a vector
of terms (variables or objects) matching the type schema of α. Then, the formulas P(α(Et)),
F(α(Et)), O(α(Et)), W(α(Et)), and Do(α(Et)) are action status atoms. The set AS= {P,F,O,
W,Do} is called the action status set.
We will often abuse notation and omit parentheses in action status atoms, writing Pα(Et)
instead of P(α(Et)), and so on.
An action status atom has the following intuitive meaning (a more detailed description
of the precise reading of these atoms will be provided later in Section 5.2):
– Pα means that the agent is permitted to take action α;
– Fα means that the agent is forbidden from taking α;
– Oα means that the agent is obliged to take action α;
– Wα means that obligation to take action α is waived; and,
– Doα means that the agent does take action α.
Notice that the operators P,F,O, and W have been extensively studied in the area
of deontic logic [3,71]. Moreover, the operator Do is in the spirit of the “praxiological”
operator EaA [52], which informally means that “agent a sees to it that A is the case” [71,
p. 292].
We borrow from the field of deontic logic the syntax of deontic statements; however,
we do not lay down the semantics of action programs on the basis of one of the numerous
deontic logical systems (e.g., Standard Deontic Logic (SDL), which amounts to the modal
logic KD [3,71]). We discuss the relationship between our approach and deontic logic in
detail in Section 6.
Another reason for not building upon existing deontic logic systems is that actions
in deontic logic typically do not have effects—hence, the fact that a set of actions may
all be individually permitted, but mutually impossible to be concurrently executed is not
addressed in deontic logic.
Definition 3.11 (Action rule). An action rule (rule, for short) is a clause r of the form
A←L1, . . . ,Ln (3)
where A is an action status atom, and each of L1, . . . , Ln is either an action status atom,
or a code call atom, each of which may be preceded by a negation sign (¬).
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We require that every root variable which occurs in the head A of a rule r and every
root- or path-variable occurring in a negative atom also occurs in some positive atom in the
body (this is the well-known safety requirement on rules [98]).
A rule r is to be understood as being implicitly universally quantified over the variables
in it. A rule is called positive, if no negation sign occurs in front of an action status atom
in its body.
Definition 3.12 (Agent program). An agent program P is a finite collection of rules. An
agent program P is positive, if all its rules are positive.
Example 3.6 (Tax Audit Agent revisited). Here is an example of a simple agent program
P , that may be used by a tax agent for the scenario described in Section 1. Recall that this
agent uses two relations—one called returns that contains a relational representation
of the returns filed by tax-payers, and another relation called employer_decs which
specifies the payments to various individuals reported by employers. The agent monitors
discrepancies between the amounts reported by individual taxpayers, and amounts reported
by all employers who have made payments to that person. If the amount reported by the
individual is less than 70% of the employer-reported income, then triggering an audit
program is mandatory. If the amount reported by the individual is less than 80% of the
employer-reported income, then triggering an audit program is permitted. However, if the
amount reported by the individual is over 80% then it is forbidden to run the audit program.
This is captured by the following agent program:
O(run_audit(Person))← in(R,taxdb :select(returns,name,=,Person)),
in(TotalInc,taxdb :sum_employer_decs(Person)),
R.amount6 0.7× TotalInc.
P(run_audit(Person))← in(R,taxdb :select(returns,name,=,Person)),
in(TotalInc,taxdb :sum_employer_decs(Person)),
R.amount6 0.8× TotalInc.
F(run_audit(Person))← in(R,taxdb :select(returns,name,=,Person)),
in(TotalInc,taxdb :sum_employer_decs(Person)),
R.amount> 0.8× TotalInc.
Do(run_audit(Person))← P(run_audit(Person)),
in(R,taxdb :select(returns,name,=,Person)),
in(TotalInc,taxdb :sum_employer_decs(Person)),
TotalInc> 200,000.
O(send_note(Person))←Do(run_audit(Person)).
Here, sum_employer_decs(Person) is a query provided by the tax database which
returns the sum of all the payments reported in employer_decs for an individual person.
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The second last rule says that audits are run on all people making over 200 K (according
to employer filed returns) on whom an audit run is permitted. The last rule says that if the
agent decides to run an audit program on the person’s tax return, then the agent is obliged
to notify the person that such an audit has been run. The second last rule causes a change
in object state—something that classical deontism does not do as it reasons about actions
that cause such state changes, but does not trigger them directly.
Before we complete our discussion of the syntax of agent programs, we add some useful
notation. For any action rule r of the form shown in Eq. (3) above, we denote by H(r)
the atom in the head of r , and by B(r) the collection of literals in the body; by B−(r)
we denote the negative literals among them, and by B+(r) the positive ones. Moreover,
by ¬.B−(r) we denote the atoms of the negative literals in B−(r). Finally, the index as
(respectively, cc) for any of these sets denotes restriction to the literals involving action
status atoms (respectively, code call atoms).
Example 3.7. For rule r
Doα← Pα,¬Doγ,p(X,Y ),¬s(Y ),
we have:
H(r)=Doα,
B(r)=B+(r)∪B−(r),
where B+(r)= {Pα,p(X,Y )} and B−(r)= {¬Doγ,¬s(Y )};
Bas =B+as ∪B−as, where B+as = {Pα} and B−as = {¬Doγ }; and
Bcc =B+cc ∪B−cc, where B+cc = {p(X,Y )} and B−cc = {¬s(Y )}.
Likewise, ¬.B−(r)=¬.B−as ∪¬.B−cc, where ¬.B−as = {Doγ } and ¬.B−cc = {s(Y )}.
Having defined the syntax of agent programs, we are now ready to turn to developing a
formal semantics for agent programs.
4. Why this framework?
Shoham [92, Section 3] states that a complete AOP (“agent oriented programming”)
system will have three components:
(1) “a restricted formal language with clear syntax and semantics for describing mental
state; the mental state will be defined uniquely by several modalities such as belief
and commitment;
(2) an interpreted programming language in which to define and program agents
with primitive commands such as REQUEST and INFORM; the semantics of the
programming language will be required to be faithful to the semantics of the mental
state;
(3) an ‘agentifier’, converting neutral devices into programmable agents”.
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Fig. 2. Agentification in the IMPACT agent development environment.
As stated in [92, Section 3], Shoham’s paper [92] discussed solutions only to the second
component—furthermore, Shoham states [92, Section 3] that “In contrast to the first two
components, of which I have a relatively good understanding, the third component is still
somewhat mysterious to me . . .”.
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Agentification. Our paper’s first contribution is towards the definition of an “Agentifica-
tion” methodology called AGENTIFY. This procedure specifies how to “agentify” an arbi-
trary program, thus taking a first step towards the concept of agentification. Fig. 2 shows
the procedure in the IMPACT Agent Development Environment (IADE for short), which
provides software tools for its support.
Interpreted agent programming language. A second contribution of our paper is the
definition of an agent programming language, together with a well defined syntax and
semantics. This is also a goal of Shoham’s [92] ground-breaking paper, where a syntax is
defined, and an informal semantics is given. The differences between Agent Programs and
Shoham’s AGENT-0 may be summed up as follows:
– Agent Programs provide a syntax to access data stored in arbitrary data structures,
while AGENT-0 does not—in fact, our syntax of code call conditions may also be
used to extend AGENT-0 and provide it with this capability.
– Agent Programs provide a mechanism for the agent developer to specify concurrent
action execution and in fact allows arbitrary notions of concurrency to be “plugged-
in” to agent programs. The semantics of such “plugins” are automatically handled by
our semantics (Section 5 will contain the details).
– Agent Programs have a suite of formal semantics. As we will see in this paper, and
in Part II of this paper [31] these different semantics offer a range of options to
the agent developer—as semantics grow epistemically more desirable, they incur a
computational cost. In addition, it is important to note that some agents will decide
what to do in a given situation based on some epistemic criteria, while others might
use a cost/benefit analyzes (e.g., utility theoretic measures). We have recognized this
fact, and provide a detailed complexity analysis of these semantics, which makes it
possible for the agent developer to select the semantics she deems most suitable for
our application.
– While AGENT-0’s programming language allows agents to be programmed “with
primitive commands such as REQUEST and INFORM” [92, Section 3], we program
these requests just once, and the resulting code can get automatically plugged into an
agent as described in steps 2 and 4 of the AGENTIFY algorithm. The ability to do this
comes about as a result of our code call condition mechanism.
Mental states. Shoham uses the concept of a “mental state” to denote the beliefs and
commitments of the agent. This leads to specific modalities that may be used. In contrast,
in IMPACT, we allow an agent state to be any set of objects conforming to the agent’s
associated data types. Specific types within an agent’s repertoire can be used to store
beliefs, and specific functions within an agent’s repertoire can be used to reason with
those beliefs. In this paper, we do not focus very much on beliefs—that is discussed in
a companion paper by Dix et al. [30]. There, it is shown that reasoning with beliefs can
be encoded into the concept of agent programs described here. Like Shoham [92], we use
modalities to describe commitments of the agent.
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5. Semantics for agent programs
If an agent uses an action program P , the question that the agent must answer, over and
over again is: What is the set of all action status atoms of the form Doα that are true with
respect to P , the current state,OS , the underlying setAC of action constraints, and the set
IC of underlying integrity constraints on agent states? This defines the set of actions that
the agent must take. In this section, we will provide a series of successively more refined
semantics for action programs that answers this question.
In Section 5.1, we will introduce the concept of a feasible status set. Feasible status sets
do not, by themselves constitute a semantics for agent programs, but they form the basic
construct upon which all our semantics will be built.
In Section 5.2, we will define the semantics of Agent Programs to be those feasible status
sets that are deemed to satisfy certain rationality requirements. In Section 5.3, we add a
further requirement—the semantics of an agent program P is characterized by a subset
of rational status sets—those that satisfy an additional reasonable-ness condition. This is
further refined in Section 5.6.1, where two alternative policies for selecting the “right”
reasonable status sets are provided. As feasible status sets may allow certain actions to
be neither permitted nor forbidden, we introduce the notation of a complete status set in
Section 5.6.2. Two policies are allowed—one of these policies is akin to the closed world
assumption in databases [78] (all actions that are not explicitly permitted are forbidden) and
the other is akin to the open world assumption (all actions that are not explicitly forbidden
are allowed).
All the preceding semantics describe ways of syntactically selecting one or more feasible
status sets as somehow being the “right” feasible status sets. For example, rational status
sets are all feasible status sets, but not vice versa. Reasonable status sets are also feasible
status sets (and in fact rational status sets) but not vice versa. The same applies to the
other types of status sets. In Section 5.7, we use numerical cost measures to select status
sets. Given a semantics Sem where Sem ∈ {Feasible, Rational, Reasonable, F-preferential,
P-preferential, Weak Rational}, Section 5.7 shows how to associate a “cost” with each
Sem-status set. An optimal Sem-status set is one which minimizes cost. A status set’s cost
may be defined in terms of (1) the cost of performing the Do actions in that status set,
and/or (2) the “badness” value of the state that results, and/or (3) a mix of the previous two
criteria. Section 5.7 will define these expressions formally.
Fig. 3 captures the relationship between these different semantic structures. The
definition of Sem-status sets is layered on top of the definitions of the other semantics—
hence, to avoid clutter, we do not include them in this figure.
5.1. Feasible status sets
In this section, we will introduce the important concept of a feasible status set. While
feasible status sets do not constitute a semantics for agent programs, every semantics we
define for Agent Programs will build upon this basic definition.
Intuitively, a feasible status set consists of assertions about the status of actions, such
that these assertions are compatible with (but are not necessarily forced to be true by) the
rules of the agent program and the underlying action and integrity constraints.
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Fig. 3. Relationship between different status sets (SS).
In what follows, we assume the existence of a body of software code S = (TS ,FS),
an action base AB, and action and integrity constraints AC and IC, respectively, in the
background. The first concept we introduce are status sets.
Definition 5.1 (Status set). A status set is any set S of ground action status atoms over
S . For any operator Op ∈ {P,Do,F,O,W}, we denote by Op(S) the set Op(S) = {α |
Op(α) ∈ S}.
Informally, a status set S represents information about the status of ground actions.
If some atom Op(α) occurs in S, then this means that the status Op is true for α. For
example, Do(α),F(β) ∈ S means that action α will be taken by the agent, while action
β is forbidden. Of course, not every status set is meaningful. For example, if both F(α)
and P(α) are in S, then S is intuitively inconsistent, since α cannot be simultaneously
permitted and forbidden. In order to characterize the meaningful status sets, we introduce
the concepts of deontic and action consistency.
Definition 5.2 (Deontic and action consistency). A status set S is called deontically
consistent, if it satisfies the following rules for any ground action α:
– If Oα ∈ S, then Wα /∈ S.
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– If Pα ∈ S, then Fα /∈ S.
– If Pα ∈ S, then OS |= Pre(α) (i.e., α is executable in the state OS ).
A status set S is called action consistent, if S,OS |=AC holds.
Besides consistency, we also wish that presence of particular atoms in S entails the
presence of other atoms in S. For example, if Oα is in S, then we expect that Pα is also in
S, and if Oα is in S, then we would like to have Doα in S. This is captured by the concept
of deontic and action closure.
Definition 5.3 (Deontic and action closure). The deontic closure of a status S, denoted
DCl(S), is the closure of S under the rule
If Oα ∈ S, then Pα ∈ S,
where α is any ground action. We say that S is deontically closed, if S =DCl(S) holds.
The action closure of a status set S, denoted ACl(S), is the closure of S under the rules
If Oα ∈ S, then Doα ∈ S,
If Doα ∈ S, then Pα ∈ S,
where α is any ground action. We say that a status S is action-closed, if S = ACl(S) holds.
The reader will easily notice that status sets that are action-closed are also deontic-ally
closed, i.e.,
– ACl(S)= S implies DCl(S)= S,
– DCl(S)⊆ ACl(S), for all S.
A status set S which is consistent and closed is certainly a meaningful assignment of a
status to each ground action. Notice that we may have ground actions α that do not occur
anywhere within a status set—this means that no commitment about the status of α has
been made.
Given a status set S, the operator AppP,OS (S) computes all action status atoms that may
be inferred to be true by allowing the rules in P to fire exactly once.
Definition 5.4 (Operator AppP,OS (S)). Suppose P is an agent program, and OS is an
agent state. Then, AppP,OS (S) is defined to be the set of all ground action status atoms A
such that there exists a rule in P having a ground instance of the form r :A←L1, . . . ,Ln
such that
(1) B+as(r)⊆ S and ¬.B−as(r)∩ S = ∅, and
(2) every code call χ ∈ B+cc(r) succeeds in OS , and
(3) every code call χ ∈ ¬.B−cc(r) does not succeed in OS , and
(4) for every atom Op(α) ∈ B+(r) ∪ {A} such that Op ∈ {P,O,Do}, the action α is
executable in state OS .
Note that part (4) of the above definition only applies to the “positive” modes P,O,Do.
It does not apply to atoms of the form Fα as such actions are not executed, nor does it
apply to atoms of the form Wα because such actions are executed only if Doα is true.
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Example 5.1. For example, consider a simple agent program P consisting of the rules:
Doα(X)← in(X,d :f(a,b)),Fβ1(X),¬Pβ2(X).
Pγ (X)← in(X,d :f(a,b)),Pβ2(X).
Suppose that in the current state, d :f(a,b) returns {a,b}. Further, suppose that β1(b)
and γ (b)’s precondition is false in the current state, and that all other actions have true
preconditions. Then:
AppP,OS ({Fβ1(a)})= {Doα(a)}; (4)
AppP,OS ({Fβ1(a),Pβ2(a),Pβ2(b)})= {Pγ (a)}. (5)
Note that in Eq. (5), Pγ (b) is not obtained from the second rule, since γ (b) is not
executable in the current state (i.e., its precondition is false).
Our approach is to base the semantics of agent programs on consistent and closed status
sets. However, we have to take into account the rules of the program as well as integrity
constraints. This leads us to the notion of a feasible status set.
Definition 5.5 (Feasible status set). Let P be an agent program and let OS be an agent
state. Then, a status set S is a feasible status set for P on OS , if the following conditions
hold:
(S1) (closure under the program rules) AppP,OS (S)⊆ S;
(S2) (deontic and action consistency) S is deontically and action consistent;
(S3) (deontic and action closure) S is action closed and deontically closed;
(S4) (state consistency) O′S |= IC, where O′S = apply(Do(S),OS) is the state which
results after taking all actions in Do(S) on the state OS .
Notice that condition (S2) is hereditary, i.e., if a status set S satisfies (S2), then any
subset S′ ⊆ S satisfies (S2) as well.
In general, there are action programs that have zero, one or several feasible status sets.
Example 5.2 (Tax Audit Agent revisited). Let us return to the Tax Example (cf.
Example 3.6). Let us consider the case where the tax database system, taxdb, contains
the following relations:
Relation returns Relation employer_decs
Name Amount
John Smith 50,000
Jane Shady 78,000
Denis Rumble 35,000
. . . . . .
Name Company Amount
John Smith ABC Inc. 46,000
John Smith DEF Inc. 35,000
Jane Shady DEF Inc. 100,000
Denis Rumble ABC Inc. 34,000
. . . . . . . . .
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It is easy to see that of these individuals, John Smith has declared under 70% of his
income (as reported by ABC Inc. and DEF Inc.). By the rules, it is obligatory to audit him,
i.e., if we take P to be the set of rules in Example 3.6, then Orun_audit(John Smith) is
implied by the program. In the same vein, Prun_audit(Jane Shady) is true. Last but not
least, Frun_audit(Denis Rumble) is true.
If we assume there are no integrity constraints and no action constraints, then this leads
to the following two possible feasible status sets:
FSS1 = {Orun_audit(John Smith),Dorun_audit(John Smith),
Prun_audit(John Smith),Frun_audit(Denis Rumble),
Prun_audit(Jane Shady)},
FSS2 = {Orun_audit(John Smith),Dorun_audit(John Smith),
Prun_audit(John Smith),Frun_audit(Denis Rumble),
Prun_audit(Jane Shady),Dorun_audit(Jane Shady)}.
(Other feasible status sets exist, though.) The two feasible status sets differ on whether Jane
Shady is actually audited or not.
Example 5.3. The program P containing the rules
Pα←
Fα←
clearly does not have any feasible status set.
The following are immediate consequences of the definition of a feasible status set,
which confirm that it appropriately captures a “possible” set of actions dictated by an agent
program that is consistent with the obligations and restrictions on the agent program.
Proposition 5.1. Let S be a feasible status set. Then,
If Do(α) ∈ S, then OS |= pre(α);
If Pα /∈ S, then Do(α) /∈ S;
If Oα ∈ S, thenOS |= Pre(α);
If Oα ∈ S, then Fα /∈ S.
The reader may be tempted to believe that condition (4) in Definition 5.4 is redundant.
However, as the following agent program P amply demonstrates, this is not the case.
Example 5.4. Consider the agent program P given by:
Pα←
Assume that α is not executable in state OS . Then, under the current definition, no feasible
status set S contains Pα; e.g., S = ∅ is a feasible status set. If we drop condition (4) from
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Definition 5.4, then no feasible status set S exists, as Pα must be contained in every such
S, which then violates deontic consistency.
5.2. Rational status sets
Intuitively, a feasible status set describes a set of status atoms that are compatible with
the state of the software, the obligations and restrictions imposed on the agent by its
associated Agent Program, and the deontic consistency requirements. Nevertheless, we
note that feasible status sets may include Doing actions that are not strictly necessary.
For example, let us return to our tax audit scenario. Our system may have the following
rules.
Example 5.5 (Expanded Tax Audit Agent). For some reason, the tax agent has decided
that it is obliged to sue an unfortunate individual called Jim Black. However, there is a rule
that says that if it has failed to previously interview the person and failed to previously issue
a notice to the person, then it is forbidden to sue to the taxpayer. This can be represented
as the following set of rules. These rules may be added to the Agent Program described in
Example 3.6.
Osue(Jim Black, T + 1)← .
Fsue(Person, T )←¬Doissue_notice(P,T1), T1 < T,
¬Dointerview(P,T2), T2 < T.
The action sue(Person, T ) has no preconditions and no effects on the state of the system
(except to send a message to another agent that initiates the lawsuit). This agent program
has the following feasible status sets. (We assume that the only time points we are interested
in are now and (now+ 1)—furthermore, for notational simplicity, we do not explicitly list
implied action status atoms of them form Wα and Pα).
FSS1 = {Osue(Jim Black,now+ 1),
Dosue(Jim Black,now+ 1),Doissue_notice(Jim Black,now), . . .}.
FSS2 = {Osue(Jim Black,now+ 1),
Dosue(Jim Black,now+ 1),Dointerview(Jim Black,now), . . .}.
FSS3 = {Osue(Jim Black,now+ 1),Dosue(Jim Black,now+ 1),
Dointerview(Jim Black,now),
Doissue_notice(Jim Black,now), . . .}.
Here, we only show O and Do atoms in the feasible status sets; each status may be
completed by adding appropriate further atoms involving other modalities.
The first status set says that to sue Jim Black at time (now+ 1), the tax agent must issue
a notice to him now. The second status set says that to sue Jim Black at time (now+ 1), the
tax agent must interview him now. The last status set says that we should both interview
him and issue a notice to him now. (The reader can easily see how this example may be
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expanded to accommodate a larger time window, allowing Jim Black some extra time to
respond, etc.)
If one examines FSS3, this is a perfectly valid feasible status set. However, it takes one
action that is not strictly necessary. To meet the obligation of suing Jim Black at time
(now+ 1), either he should be issued a notice now, or should be interviewed now—there
is no need for both. Surely, then, FSS3 represents a case where the agent is doing “too
much”?
The notion of a rational status set is postulated to accommodate this kind of reasoning.
It is based on the principle that each action which is executed should be sufficiently
“grounded” or “justified” by the agent program. That is, there should be evidence from
the rules of the agent program that a certain action must be executed. For example, it
seems unacceptable that an action α is executed, if α does not occur in any rule of the
agent program at all.
This way, we also have to make sure that execution of an action must not be driven by
the need to preserve the consistency of the agent’s state. Rather, the integrity constraints
should serve to prevent executions which appear to be rational if no integrity constraints
were present. This motivates the following formal notion of groundedness.
Definition 5.6 (Groundedness; rational status set). A status set S is grounded, if there
exists no status set S′ different from S such that S′ ⊂ S and S′ satisfies conditions (S1)–
(S3) of a feasible status set.
A status set S is a rational status set, if S is a feasible status set and S is grounded.
Notice that if S is a feasible status set, then every S′ ⊆ S satisfies the condition (S2) of
feasibility. Therefore, the requirement of (S2) for S′ in the definition of groundedness is
redundant. However, it seems more natural to have this condition included in the definition
of groundedness. Moreover, if we did not have hereditary action consistency, then inclusion
of action consistency would be indispensable.
Example 5.6 (Tax example continued). The program P of Example 5.5 has two rational
status sets: FSS1 and FSS2. In this case, as no integrity constraints IC are specified,
the rational status sets happen to be the minimal feasible status sets with respect to set
inclusion.
Example 5.7 (Simple Driving example). Suppose we want an agent which selects—in a
simplified setting—the driving lane for a car. The action base contains the two actions
go_right and drive(Lane). The precondition of the go_right is empty, while the
precondition of drive(Lane) is free(Lane). The agent program contains the following
rules:
O(go_right)←
O(drive(right_lane))←Do(go_right)
F(drive(Lane))←¬free(Lane)
Do(drive(left_lane))← F(drive(right_lane))
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Here, we suppose that there are two lanes, a left lane and a right lane. The first rule says
that we must go on the right side, and the second that we must drive on the right lane if we
actually go on the right side. The third rule tells that it is forbidden to use a lane if it is not
free, i.e., it is blocked, while the last rules says that we go on the left lane if we can not use
the right lane.
Depending on the status of the lanes (free or blocked), the program has different rational
status sets. In each of the four possible cases, the program has a unique rational status
set. All of them contain O(go_right), Do(go_right), and P(go_right). Two cases
arise, depending on whether the right lane is free or not.
(1) Suppose the right lane is free. Then, by the second rule the obligation to drive in the
right lane is derived. The agent can take this action without raising an inconsistency,
regardless of whether the left lane is free or blocked. In either case, we obtain a
rational status set S such that
Do(S)= {go_right, drive(right_lane)}.
(2) Suppose the right lane is blocked. Then, the precondition of drive(right_lane)
fails, and F(drive(right_lane)) is derived by the third rule. Now, if the left
lane is free, then we can derive by the last rule Do(drive(left_lane)), and we
obtain a rational status set S such that
Do(S)= {go_right,drive(left_lane)};
on the other hand, if the left lane is blocked, the last rule does not yield
Do(drive(left_lane)) as the precondition of drive(left_lane) fails. In
this case, we obtain a rational status set S such that Do(S)= {go_right}.
The behavior of the agent is perfectly as desired.
Observe that the definition of groundedness does not include condition (S4) of a
feasible status set. A moment of reflection will show that omitting this condition is indeed
appropriate. Recall that the integrity constraints must be maintained when the current
agent state is changed into a new agent state. If we were to include the condition (S4)
in groundedness, it may happen that the agent is forced to execute some actions which the
program does not mention, just in order to maintain the integrity constraints. The following
example illustrates this point.
Example 5.8. Suppose that in the Tax Audit Agent example, the table employer_decs
has attached the integrity constraint IC which says that for each person P and company
C, at most one record for this person and that company is filed. Furthermore, assume
that actions add_ed(P,C,A) and del_ed(P,C) for adding and deleting a record from
employer_decs, respectively, are available, and an agent program has the simple rule:
Doadd_ed(JohnSmith,ABC Inc.,30,000)← .
However, in the state reported in Example 5.2 there is already a record (John Smith,ABC
Inc.,46,000) in the table, and thus adding the record (John Smith,ABC Inc.,30,000) violates
the integrity constraint IC. Therefore,
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S1 = {Doadd_ed(John Smith,ABC Inc.,30,000),
Padd_ed(John Smith,ABC Inc.,30,000)}
is not a feasible status set. However, the status set
S2 = {Doadd_ed(JohnSmith,ABC Inc.,30,000),
Padd_ed(John Smith,ABC Inc.,30,000),
Dodel_ed(John Smith,ABC Inc.,46,000),
Pdel_ed(John Smith,ABC Inc.,46,000)}
is a feasible status set, and it is easily seen that no smaller feasible status set S3 exists such
that S3 ⊂ S2. The implicit execution of del_ed(John Smith,ABC Inc.,46,000) may be
unwanted, however, and thus S2 is intuitively not acceptable as the “right” set of actions to
take by the agent. This is expressed by the fact that the smaller status set S1 ⊂ S2 is sound
with the rules of the program, and no extra actions for maintaining the integrity constraints
should be taken by the agent.
Observe that automatic maintenance of integrity constraints is an ongoing research is-
sues in databases, and a simple, declarative solution to this problem is by no means clear
[46]. Therefore, we do not delve into the intricated and complex more general problem
here.
The fact that the program in Example 5.7 always had a unique rational status set in
each of the possible scenarios, was not accidental. In fact, as will be shown below, positive
programs enjoy the benign property of having a unique rational status sets, if any rational
status set exists. Observe that this property does not hold for nonpositive agent programs
in general.
It is possible to give a characterization of the unique rational status set in terms of a
fixpoint operator, akin to the least fixpoint of logic programs [2,59]. For that, we define for
every positive program P and agent state OS an operator TP,OS which maps a status set
S to another status set.
Definition 5.7 (TP,OS operator). Suppose P is an agent program and OS an agent state.
Then, for any status set S,
TP,OS (S)= AppP,OS (S) ∪DCl(S)∪ ACl(S).
Note that as DCl(S)⊆ ACl(S), we may equivalently write this as
TP,OS (S)= AppP,OS (S) ∪ ACl(S).
The following technical property of feasible status sets says that if S is a status set which is
deontically/action closed and closed under the program rules, then TP,OS (S)⊆ S. In other
words, TP,OS (S) cannot add any new action status atoms to S, though it might eliminate
some from S.
Lemma 5.2. Let P be an agent program, let OS be any agent state, and let S be any
status set. If S satisfies (S1) and (S3) of feasibility, then S is a pre-fixpoint of TP,OS , i.e.,
TP,OS (S)⊆ S.
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The above lemma is a technical stepping stone that enables us to show that when positive
agent programsP are considered, then the TP,OS operator is guaranteed to have a fixpoint.
The reason for this is that if the programP is positive, then TP,OS is a monotone operator,
i.e., S ⊆ S′ implies TP,OS (S)⊆ TP,OS (S′), and hence, it has a least fixpoint lfp(TP,OS ).
Moreover, since TP,OS is in fact continuous, i.e., TP,OS (
⋃∞
i=0 S0)=
⋃∞
i=0 TP,OS (Si) for
any chain S0 ⊆ S1 ⊆ S2 ⊆ · · · of status sets, the least fixpoint is given by
lfp(TP,OS )=
∞⋃
i=0
T iP,OS ,
where T 0P,OS = ∅ and T i+1P,OS = TP,OS (T iP,OS ), for all i > 0 (see, e.g. [2,59]).
We may use the above reasoning to establish the following important result. The result
states that for positive agent programs, the only possible rational status set is the least
fixpoint of TP,OS . This theorem therefore provides a mechanism to construct a rational
status set for positive agent programs, by directly computing lfp(TP,OS ).
Theorem 5.3. Let P be a positive agent program, and let OS be an agent state. Then, S
is a rational status set of P onOS , if and only if S = lfp(TP,OS ) and S is a feasible status
set.
Notice that in case of a positive program, lfp(TP,OS ) always satisfies the conditions
(S1) and (S3) of a feasible status set (i.e., all closure conditions), and thus is a rational
status set if it satisfies (S2) and (S4), i.e., the consistency criteria. The uniqueness of the
rational status set is immediate from the previous theorem.
Corollary 5.4. Let P be a positive agent program. Then, on every agent state OS , the
rational status set of P (if one exists) is unique, i.e., if S,S′ are rational status sets for P
on OS , then S = S′.
As shown by Example 5.5, Corollary 5.4 is no longer true in the presence of negated
action status atoms. We postpone the discussion of the existence of a unique rational status
set at this point, since we will introduce a stronger concept than rational status sets below
for which this discussion seems more appropriate. Nonetheless, we note the following
property on the existence of a (not necessarily unique) rational status set.
Proposition 5.5. Let P be an agent program. If IC = ∅, then P has a rational status set
if and only if P has a feasible status set.
Moreover, we remark at this point that the unique rational status set of a positive program
(if it exists) can be computed in polynomial time under suitable assumptions.
5.2.1. Reading of rational status sets
We are now ready to return to the question “Exactly how should we read the atoms
Op(α) for Op ∈ {P,F,W,O,Do} appearing in a rational status set?” In Section 3.3, we
had promised a discussion of this issue. It appears that an interpretation:
Op(α)≡ “It is the case that α is Op∗”,
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where Op∗ is the proper verb corresponding to operator Op (forbidden, permitted, etc.), is
not the one which is expressed inherently by rational status sets. Rather, a status atom in a
rational status set should be more appropriately interpreted as follows:
Op(α)≡ “It is derivable that α should be Op∗”,
where “derivable”—without giving a precise definition here—means that Op(α) is
obtained from the rules of the agent program and the deontic axioms, under reasonable
assumptions about the status of actions; the groundedness property of the rational status
set ensures that the adopted assumptions are as conservative as possible.
Furthermore, a literal ¬Op(α) in a program should be interpreted as:
¬Op(α)≡ “It is not derivable that α should be Op∗”.
It is important to emphasize that there is no reason to view a rational status set as an
ideally rational agent’s three-valued model of a two-valued reality, in which each action is
either forbidden or permitted. For example, the agent program
Pα←
Fα← Pβ
Fα← Fβ
has a unique rational status set, namely S = {Pα}. A possible objection against this
rational status set (which arises naturally from similar arguments in logic programming
with incomplete information) is the following.
(1) β is either forbidden or permitted.
(2) In either of these two cases, α is forbidden.
(3) Therefore, the rational status set S = {Pα} is “wrong”.
“Complete” status sets, defined in Section 5.6 remedy this problem (at a cost, as we shall
see later when complexity issues are discussed).
This brings us back to our interpretation of Opα. The fallacy in the above argument is
the implicit equivalence assumed to hold between the statement “β is either forbidden or
permitted” and the statement Pβ ∨ Fβ . The latter statement is read “It is either derivable
that β is permitted, or it is derivable that β is forbidden” which is certainly very different
from the former statement.
In addition, we believe that deontic logic is different from the setting of reasoning with
incomplete information because the true state of affairs need not be one in which the status
of every particular action is decided. In fact, the status may be open—and it may even be
impossible to refine it without arriving at inconsistency. For example, this applies to the
legal domain, which is one of the most fertile application areas of deontic logic.
5.3. Reasonable status sets
A more serious attack against rational status sets, stemming from the authors’
background in nonmonotonic logic programming is that for agent programs with negation,
the semantics of rational status sets allows logical contraposition of the program rules. For
example, consider the following program:
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Do(α)←¬Do(β).
This program has two rational status sets: S1 = {Do(α),P(α)}, and S2 = {Do(β),P(β)}.
The second rational status set is obtained by applying the contrapositive of the rule:
Do(β)←¬Do(α).
However, the second rational set seems less intuitive than the first as there is no explicit
rule in the above program that justifies the derivation of this Do(β).
This observation leads us to the following remarks. First, in the area of logic
programming and knowledge representation, the meaning of negation in rules has been
extensively discussed and there is broad consensus in that area that contraposition is a
proof principle which should not be applied: rather, derivation should be constructive from
rules. These observations led to the well known stable model semantics for logic programs
due to Gelfond and Lifschitz [38] which in turn was shown to have strong equivalences
with the classical nonmonotonic reasoning paradigms such as default logic [79] and auto-
epistemic logic [72] (see [39,66]), as well as numerical reasoning paradigms such as linear
programming and integer programming [14,15].
Second, the presence of derivation by contraposition may have a detrimental effect on the
complexity of programs, since it inherently simulates disjunction. Therefore, it is advisable
to have a mechanism which cuts down possible rational status sets in an effective and
appealing way, so that negation can be used without introducing high computational cost.
For these reasons, we introduce the concept of a reasonable status set. The reader should
note that if he really does want to use contraposition, then he should choose the rational
status set approach, rather than the reasonable status set approach.
Definition 5.8 (Reasonable status set). Let P be an agent program, let OS be an agent
state, and let S be a status set.
(1) If P is a positive agent program, then S is a reasonable status set for P on OS , if
and only if S is a rational status set for P on OS .
(2) The reduct of P with respect to S andOS , denoted by redS(P,OS), is the program
which is obtained from the ground instances of the rules in P over OS as follows.
(a) First, remove every rule r such that B−as(r)∩ S 6= ∅;
(b) Remove all atoms in B−as(r) from the remaining rules.
Then S is a reasonable status set for P with respect toOS , if it is a reasonable status
set of the program redS(P,OS) with respect to OS .
Suppose we think of S as a guess about all action status atoms that are possibly true
in a feasible status set. We then want to check what the necessary consequences of this
assumption are, assuming it is correct. If these necessary consequences coincided with our
initial guess, then our guess was “good” in the sense that we did not guess too much or too
little.
The program redS(P,OS) is constructed according to the above intuition: if a rule r has
an action status literal of the form ¬Opα in its body where α ∈ S, then if guess S were
correct, then rule r cannot possibly fire, and hence it can be eliminated. On the other hand
if all negative action status literals of the form ¬Opα in its body are not in S, then none
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of the Opα’s is deemed possible by our guess, so we may eliminate them from rule r’s
body. Note that we cannot eliminate positive literals because we need to know that they are
necessarily true, but our guess merely says they are possible.
Now we check if all the action status atoms that necessarily follow from the simplified
program redS(P,OS) coincide with our initial guess S—if so, then we did not guess too
much or too little, and we declare S to be a reasonable status set.
Let us quickly revisit our Tax Audit Agent scenario to see why reasonable status sets
reflect an improvement on rational status sets.
Example 5.9 (Tax Audit Agent example, revisited). Suppose we reconsider the tax audit
agent example, as described in Examples 3.6 and 5.2. However, we merely consider the
two rules listed below.
Fsend_refund(Person)←Dorun_audit(Person),
¬in(Person,taxdb : refund_authorized()).
Dosend_refund(Person)←¬Fsend_refund(Person),
in(Person,taxdb : refund_authorized()).
The first rule above says that sending a refund to an audited person is forbidden unless
the refund has been explicitly authorized. One may think of a situation where all audit
results are sent to a human being who examines the audit result and determines whether to
authorize a refund or not. In the former case, he explicitly updates a list of people to whom
refunds may be sent—this list of people is retrieved by the refund_authorized()
call. The second rule says that we may send a refund to anyone who is not explicitly
forbidden from receiving a refund. Here, the preconditions of the actions send_refund
and run_audit are assumed to be void for the sake of simplicity.
Rational status sets. Consider now the case of an individual, John Doe, who has been
audited, and whose refund has been authorized by a human being. In this case, the
precondition of the first rule is not true. It is important to note that the reduct of this program
does not affect the first rule, because the negation (in the body of the first rule) is in front
of a code call and not in front of an action status atom.
Now consider the second rule—we have two rational status sets—one in which John
Doe’s refund is sent, while in the other, it is forbidden. However, the latter is clearly
incorrect. The reason for this is because in rational status sets, the second rule is treated as
equivalent to its converse:
Fsend_refund(Person)←¬Dosend_refund(Person),
in(Person,taxdb : refund_authorized()).
Reasonable status sets. Now consider the sets S1 = {Fsend_refund(John Doe)} and
S2 = {Dosend_refund(John Doe)}. Assume that the only individual we are interested
in for our program P is John Doe. Consider S2. The reduct of P with respect to S2 consists
of the rules:
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Fsend_refund(John Doe)←Dorun_audit(John Doe),
¬in(John Doe,taxdb : refund_authorized()).
Dosend_refund(John Doe)← in(John Doe,taxdb : refund_authorized()).
It is easy to see that the reduct has a unique rational status set, namely S2 itself.
Now consider S1. The reduct of P with respect to S1 consists of just the first rule above,
from which we cannot derive Fsend_refund(John Doe) because the body of that rule is
not true with respect to the agent state. Thus, in contrast to the rational status set semantics,
the reasonable status set semantics eliminates this unintuitive rational status set, sending
John Doe his (well deserved) refund check.
A more simplistic example is presented below.
Example 5.10. For the program P :
Doβ←¬Doα,
the reduct of P with respect to S = {Doβ,Pβ} on agent state OS is the program
Doβ← .
Clearly, S is the unique reasonable status set of redS(P,OS), and hence S is a reasonable
status set of P .
The use of reasonable status sets has also some benefits with respect to knowledge
representation. For example, the rule
Doα←¬Fα (6)
intuitively expresses that action α is executed by default, unless it is explicitly forbidden
(provided, of course, that its precondition succeeds). This default representation is possible
because under the reasonable status set approach, the rule itself can not be used to derive
Fα, which is inappropriate for a default rule.
This benefit does not accrue when using rational status sets because the single rule has
two rational status sets: S1 = {Doα,Pα} and S2 = {Fα}. If we adopt reasonable status sets,
however, then only S1 remains and α is executed. If rational status sets are used, then the
decision about whether α is executed depends on the choice between S1 and S2. (Notice
that if the agent would execute those actions α such that Doα appears in all rational status
sets, then no action is taken here. However, such an approach is not meaningful in general,
and will lead to conflicts with integrity constraints.)
The definition of reasonable status sets does not introduce a completely orthogonal type
of status set. Rather, it prunes among the rational status sets. This is shown by the following
property.
Proposition 5.6. Let P be an agent program and OS an agent state. Then, every
reasonable status set of P on OS is a rational status set of P on OS .
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In a follow-up paper [32], we are developing implementation techniques for agent
programs that implement a syntactically restricted class of agent programs called regular
agent programs that are guaranteed to have at least one reasonable status set. Existence
of reasonable status sets cannot always be guaranteed because (as we have seen); some
programs may have no feasible status sets.
5.4. Violating obligations: weak rational status sets
So far, we have adopted a semantics of agent programs which followed the principle that
actions which the agent is obliged to take are actually executed, i.e., the rule
If Oα is true, then Doα is true
is strictly obeyed. This is known as regimentation [55], and reflects the ideal behavior of
an agent in a normative system.
However, the essence of deontism is in capturing what should be done in a specific
situation, rather than what finally is to be done under any circumstances [3,48,71]. Taking
this view, the operator Oα is a suggestion for what should be done; it may be well the case,
that in a situation an obligation Oα is true, but α is not executed as it would be impossible
(due to a violation of some action constraints), or lead to inconsistency. Such a behavior,
e.g., in the legal domain, is a violation of a normative codex, which will be sanctioned in
some way.
Example 5.11 (Conflicting Obligations). Suppose an agent A is obliged to serve requests
of other agents A1 and A2, represented by facts O(serve(A1)) and O(serve(A2)),
respectively, but there is an action constraint which states that no two service requests
can be satisfied simultaneously. This scenario is described by the program P :
O(serve(A1))←
O(serve(A2))←
and the action constraint
AC : {serve(A1),serve(A2)}←↩ true.
The programP has no rational status set (and even no feasible status set exists). The reason
is that not both obligations can be followed without raising an inconsistency, given by a
violation of the action constraint AC.
Thus, in the above example, the program is inconsistent and the agent does not take
any action. In reality, however, we would expect that the agent serves at least one of the
requests, thus only violating one of the obligations. The issue of which request the agent
should select for service may depend on additional information—e.g., priority information,
or penalties for each of the requests. In absence of any further directives, however, the agent
may arbitrarily choose one of the requests.
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This example and the sketched desired behavior of the agent prompts us to introduce
another generalization of our approach, to a semantics for agent programs which takes into
account possible violations of the rule
If Oα is true, then Doα is true
in order to reach a consistent status set. An important issue at this point is which obligations
an agent may violate, and how to proceed if different alternatives exist. We assume in the
following that no additional information about obligations and their violations is given,
and develop our approach on this basis. Weak rational status sets introduced below allow
obligations to be “dropped” when conflicts arise. Later, Section 5.7 discusses how to build
more complex structures involving cost/benefit information on top of weak rational status
sets.
Our intent is to generalize the rational status set approach gracefully, and similarly the
reasonable status set approach. That is, in the case where a program P has a rational status
set on an agent state OS , then this status set (respectively, the collection of all such status
sets) should be the meaning of the program. On the other hand, if no rational status set
exists, then we are looking for possible violations of obligations which make it possible
to have such a status set. In this step, we apply Occam’s Razor and violate the set of
obligations as little as possible; i.e., we adopt a status set S which is rational, if a set O of
rules Oα⇒ Doα is disposed, and such that no similar status set S′ for some disposal set
O′ exists which is a proper subset of O. We formalize this intuition next in the concept of
weak rational (respectively, reasonable) status set.
Definition 5.9 (Relativized action closure). Let S be a status set, and let A be a set of
ground actions. Then, the action closure of S under regimentation relativized to A, denoted
AClA(S), is the closure of S under the rules
Oα ∈ S⇒Doα ∈ S, for any ground action α ∈A
Doβ ∈ S⇒ Pβ ∈ S, for any ground action β.
A set S is action closed under regimentation relativized to A, if S = AClA(S) holds.
The following example illustrates this definition.
Example 5.12. Suppose we have:
A1 = {α,γ },
A2 = {β},
S = {Oα,Oβ,Doγ }.
Then the action closure of S under regimentation relativized to A1 is given by:
AClA1(S)= S ∪ {Doα,Pα,Pγ }.
Note that AClA1(S) is constructed by only examining obligations of actions in A1 (in
particular, action β is not considered), and closing S under the two closure rules in the
preceding definition.
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On the other hand, the action closure of S under regimentation relativized to A2 is given
by:
AClA2(S)= S ∪ {Doβ,Pβ,Pγ }.
Notice that ACl= AClGA, where GA is the set of all ground actions. Using the concept
of relativized action closure, we define weak versions of feasible (respectively, rational,
reasonable) status sets.
Definition 5.10 (Relativized status sets). Let P be a program, let OS be an agent state,
and let A be a set of ground actions. Then, a status set S is A-feasible (respectively,
A-rational, A-reasonable), if S satisfies the condition of feasible (respectively, rational,
reasonable) status set, where the action closure ACl is replaced by the relativized action
closure AClA (butDCl remains unchanged).
Definition 5.11 (Weak rational, reasonable status sets). A status set S is weak rational
(respectively, weak reasonable), if there exists an A such that S is A-rational (respectively,
A-reasonable) and there are no A′ 6= A and S′ such that A ⊆ A′ and S′ is an A′-rational
(respectively,A′-reasonable) status set.
Observe that for a positive program, the set S′ which witnesses that S is not weak rational
(respectively, weak reasonable) must be a superset of S (this follows from Theorem 5.9
below). However, S′ and S are in general unrelated for arbitrary programs, since due to
negation in rule bodies, following more obligations may block the application of previously
firing rules.
An immediate consequence of the previous definition is the following.
Corollary 5.7. Let P be an agent program. If P has a rational (respectively, reasonable)
status set on an agent state OS , then the weak rational (respectively, weak reasonable)
status sets of P on OS coincide with the rational (respectively, reasonable) status sets of
P on OS .
Thus, the concept of weak rational (respectively, reasonable) status set is a conservative
extension of rational (respectively, reasonable) status set as desired.
Example 5.13 (Conflicting Obligations—continued). The program P has two weak
rational status sets, namely
W1 = {O(serve(A1)), O(serve(A2)),
P(serve(A1)), P(serve(A2)), Do(serve(A1)},
W2 = {O(serve(A1)), O(serve(A2)),
P(serve(A1)), P(serve(A2)), Do(serve(A2)}.
The set W1 is a {serve(A1)}-rational status set, while symmetrically W2 is a
{serve(A2)}-rational status set. Both W1 and W2 are also weak reasonable status sets
of P .
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As the previous example shows, even a positive agent program may have more than
one weak rational status set. Moreover, in other scenarios, no weak rational status set
exists. To cure the first problem, one could impose a total preference ordering on the weak
rational status sets. The second problem needs a more sophisticated treatment which is
not straightforward; after all, the presence of some conflicts which cannot be avoided by
violating obligations indicates that there is a major problem, and we must question whether
the agent program P is properly stated by the individual describing the agent.
5.4.1. Characterization of weak rational status sets
By generalizing the definitions in Section 5.2, it is possible to characterize the weak
rational status sets of a positive agent program P using a fixpoint operator.
Definition 5.12 (Operator TP,OS ,A). Suppose P is an agent program,OS an agent state,
and A is a set of ground actions. Then, for any status set S,
TP,OS ,A(S)= AppP,OS (S) ∪DCl(S)∪ AClA(S).
Note that with respect to TP,OS (S), the action closure ACl is replaced by the relatived
action closure AClA; however, DCl(S) may not be dropped, since DCl(S) 6⊆ AClA(S) in
general.
Clearly, also TP,OS ,A is monotone and continuous if P is positive, and hence has
a least fixpoint lfp(TP,OS ,A) =
⋃∞
i=0 T iP,OS ,A where T
0
P,OS ,A = ∅ and T i+1P,OS ,A =
TP,OS ,A(T
i
P,OS ,A), for all i > 0.
The following characterization of A-rational status sets is then obtained.
Theorem 5.8. Let P be a positive agent program, let A be a set of ground actions, and let
OS be an agent state. Then, a status set S is an A-rational status set of P on OSC, if and
only if S = lfp(TP,OS ,A) and S is an A-feasible status set.
From the previous theorem, we obtain the following result.
Theorem 5.9. Let P be a positive agent program, and let OS be an agent state. Then, a
status set S is a weak rational status set of P on OS , if and only if S = lfp(TP,OS ,A) and
S is A-feasible for some maximal A with respect to inclusion.
In general, this criterion does not enable efficient recognition of a weak rational status
set (which is, in fact, intractable). The status set A for S in the theorem is unique, and can
be detailed as follows.
Definition 5.13 (A(S)). For any status set S, denote A(S)=Do(S) ∪{α | α /∈O(S)}.
Proposition 5.10. Let P be any agent program, and let OS be any agent state. Suppose a
status set S is A-feasible for some A. Then, S is A(S)-feasible, and A⊆A(S), i.e., A(S)
is the unique maximal set of ground actions A such that S is A-feasible.
T. Eiter et al. / Artificial Intelligence 108 (1999) 179–255 221
Thus, if S is a weak rational status set, then A= A(S) is the unique maximal set such
that S is A-feasible. From Theorem 5.9, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 5.11. Let S1, S2 be weak rational status set of a positive agent program P on
an agent state OS . Then, O(S1)=O(S2) implies S1 = S2.
As a consequence, for every choice of a maximal set of obligations which can be obeyed,
the resulting weak rational status set is uniquely determined, if P is positive. This means
that the commitment to a set of obligations does not introduce further ambiguities about
the status of actions, which is a desired feature of the semantics.
It is easy to see that the operator TP,OS ,A is monotone in A, i.e., enjoys the following
property.
Proposition 5.12. Let P be a positive agent program, let OS be an agent state, and
let A1,A2 be sets of ground actions such that A1 ⊆ A2. Then, for any status set S,
TP,OS ,A1(S)⊆ TP,OS ,A2(S) holds, and lfp(TP,OS ,A1)⊆ lfp(TP,OS ,A2).
For the case where no integrity constraints are present, we obtain the following result
from Theorem 5.9 and Proposition 5.10.
Theorem 5.13. Let P be a positive agent program, where IC = ∅, and let OS be an
agent state. Then, a status set S is a weak rational status set of P on OS , if and only if
(i) S = lfp(TP,OS ,A) and S is A-feasible for A = A(S), and (ii) for each ground action
α /∈A(S), the status set SA′ = lfp(TP,OS ,A′) is not A′-feasible, where A′ =A(S)∪ {α}.
For a fixed program P , this criterion implies under suitable assumptions a polynomial
time algorithm for the recognition of a weak rational status set in this case. Moreover,
deciding whether some weak rational status set exists and actually computing one is then
possible in polynomial time. This is considered in Part II of this series of papers.
5.5. Expressing action constraints in an agent program
As we have mentioned above, action constraints do not add to the expressive power of
our framework, and provide syntactic sugar which is, however, convenient. We discuss this
now a little more in detail.
For every action constraint of the form{
α1
( EX1), . . . , αk( EXk)}←↩ χ (7)
in AC, include in the program P the clause
F(nil)←Do(α1( EX1)),Do(α2( EX2)), . . . ,Do(αk( EXk)),χ
where nil is a distinguished new action which has no preconditions and empty add and
delete set; moreover, include in P the rule
P(nil)← .
Let P∗(AC) be the resulting program. Then, the following property can be established.
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Proposition 5.14. Let P be an agent program, given an action base AB, action
constraints AC, and integrity constraints IC, and let OS be an agent state. Then, the
rational (respectively, reasonable) status sets of P on OS correspond 1–1 to the rational
(respectively, reasonable) status sets of P∗(AC) on OS for action base AB∗ = AB ∪
{nil}, AC∗ = ∅, and IC∗ = IC.
For feasible sets, a similar correspondence (but not 1–1) exists. Therefore, we can always
eliminate action constraints by introducing new rules in the program.
In the definition of weak action execution, a possible overlap of the add set Add(α) and
the delete set Del(β) of two actions which should be executed is ignored. If the programmer
feels unpleasant with this situation, then (s)he may add rules to the program which take care
of such a check. Namely, we add the rules
F(nil)← CCα,CCβ,Doα,Doβ
for all CCα ∈ Add(α) and CCβ ∈ Del(β), where nil is the distinguished action from
above. Then, the joint execution of α and β is prohibited. In a similar way, we can add
rules for nonground actions α( EX1) and β( EX2).
Having to add such overlap rules in the program comes at the benefit of higher flexibility
and better control of overlap checking, which also leads to faster computation in general.
We think that this is a big advantage which outweighs the stricter definition.
Analogously, this applies to more complex action constraints than joint action exe-
cutability. If, for example, execution of an action β requires execution of another action
α, then we can add rules
Do(β)←Doα,
F(nil)←Doα,¬Doβ.
Then, for every rational (respectively, reasonable) status set S, it holds that Doβ ∈ S iff
Doα ∈ S. In a similar fashion, more complex action constraints can be emulated.
5.6. Preferred and complete status sets
In this section, we study what happens when we consider three classes of rational status
sets.
– A rational status set S is F -preferred if there is no other rational status set whose set
of forbidden atoms is a strict subset of S’s set of forbidden atoms. Intuitively, such
status sets are permissive—most things are allowed unless explicitly forbidden.
– A rational status set S is P -preferred if there is no other rational status set whose set
of permitted atoms is a strict subset of S’s set of permitted atoms. Intuitively, such
status sets are dictatorial—most things are allowed unless explicitly permitted.
– The notion of a status set does not insist that for each action α, either Pα or Fα be
in S. However, for any action α, either α must be permitted or must be forbidden.
Complete status sets insist that this additional condition be satisfied.
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5.6.1. Preference
As we have briefly mentioned in the previous section, it may be desirable to use a
preference policy for cutting down of status sets. In particular, the issue whether an action
should be considered forbidden or allowed is highly relevant.
It appears that there is no straightforward solution to this problem, and that in fact
different approaches to using defaults are plausible. For example, the following two are
suggestive:
– (Weak preference) The first approach takes the view that an action should, if possible,
be considered as being not forbidden. According to this view, action sets are preferred
in which the part of forbidden actions is small. Note that due to the three-valued
nature of the status of an action in an action set (which can be forbidden, permitted,
or neither), this does not necessarily mean that the part of explicitly permitted actions
in a preferred action set is large. This policy is thus a weak default about the status of
an action.
– (Strong preference) Another approach is to enforce a deontic completion about
whether actions are permission or forbidden, and to request that in an action set,
every action is either forbidden or permitted, and such that permission is preferred
over forbiddance. This approach requires a redefinition of the notion of a grounded
consistent action set, however (keep the permission and forbidden-parts fixed). It
amounts to a kind of strong default rule that actions which are not forbidden are
explicitly permitted.
These two approaches aim at treating forbidden actions. Of course, one could foster
approaches which symmetrically aim at permitted actions, and implement (weak or strong)
default rules about such actions. Likewise, default rules for other status operators may be
designed. Which approach is in fact appropriate, or even a mixed use of different default
for different actions, may depend on the particular application domain. In the following,
we take a closer look to weak defaults rules on forbidden actions.
It would be useful if rules like
Do(α)←¬Fα
may be stated in an agent program, with the intuitive reading that action α is executed
by default, unless it is explicitly forbidden (provided, of course, that its precondition
succeeds).
This single rule has two feasible status sets which are grounded:A1 = {Do(α),Pα} and
A2 = {Fα}. Under the policy that by default, actions which are not explicitly forbidden are
considered to be permitted, A1 is preferred over A2 and α is executed. If no such default
policy is taken, then no set is preferred over the other, and it depends on the choice between
A1 and A2, whether α is executed. (If the agent executes those actions α such that Do(α)
appears in all rational status sets, then no action is taken here.) Adopting the view that
actions should not be considered forbidden unless explicitly stated motivates the following
definition.
Definition 5.14 (F -preference). A set S of action status atoms is F -preferred, if S is
a rational status set, and there exists no other rational status set S′ which has a smaller
forbidden part than S, i.e., F(S′)⊂ F(S) holds.
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Example 5.14. For the single rule program
Do(α)←¬Fα
from above, the set A1 = {Do(α), Pα} is the unique F -preferred status set of P .
On the other hand, the rule
Do(α)← Pα
has a unique F -preferred status set, which is the empty set. Assuming by weak default
that α is not forbidden, we cannot conclude Do(α), though, since an assumption Pα is not
supported.
Dual to F -preference, we can define preference for P . Intuitively, F -minimality
amounts to a “brave” principle from the view of action permission, while P -minimality
amounts to a “cautious” one. Both F - and P -minimality are the extremal instances of a
more general preference scheme, which allows to put individual preference on each action
α from the action base.
5.6.2. Complete status sets
As we have encountered in the examples above, it may happen that a feasible status set
leaves the issue of whether some action α is permitted or forbidden open.
It may be desirable, however, that this issue is resolved in a status set which is acceptable
for the user; that is, either Pα or Fα is contained in the status set. This may apply to some
particular actions α, as well as to all actions in the extremal case.
Our framework for agent programs is rich enough to handle this issue in the language in
a natural, simple way. Namely, by including a rule
Fα←¬Pα
in a program, we can ensure that every feasible (and thus rational) status set includes either
Fα or Pα; we call this rule the F/P -completion rule of α. For an agent program P , we
denote by CompF/P (P) the augmentation ofP by the F/P -completion rules for all actions
α in the action base.
Call a status set SF/P -complete, if for every ground action α, either Pα ∈ S, or Fα ∈ S.
Then, we have the following immediate property.
Proposition 5.15. Let P be an agent program. Then, every feasible status set S of
CompF/P (P) is F/P -complete.
Example 5.15. The program
Pα←
Fα← Pβ
Fα← Fβ
has a unique rational status set. However, the program CompF/P (P) has no feasible status
set, and thus also no rational status set.
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This is intuitive, if we adopt the view that the status of each action being permitted or
forbidden is complete, since there is no way to adopt either Pβ or Fβ without raising an
inconsistency.
Example 5.16. Consider the program P1:
Do(α)←¬Fα.
Here, we have two rational status sets, namely S1 = {Do(α),Pα} and S2 = {Fα}. Both are
F/P -complete, and are the rational status sets of CompP/F .
On the other hand, the program P2
Do(α)← Pα,
has the unique rational status set S = {}, while its F/P -completion has the two rational
status sets S1 and S2 from above. Thus, under F/P -completion semantics, the programs
P1 and P2 are equivalent.
In fact, the following property holds.
Proposition 5.16. Let P1 and P2 be ground agent programs andOS a state, such that P2
results by replacing in P1 any literals ±Opα in rules bodies by∓Opα, where Op ∈ {P,F }
and Op is the deontic status opposite toOp. Then, CompP/F (P1) and CompP/F (P2) have
the same sets of feasible status sets.
Hence, under F/P -completion, ¬F amounts to P and similarly ¬P to F .
Further completion rules can be used to reach a complete state on other status
information as well. For example, a completion with respect to obligation/waiving can
be reached by means of rules
Wα←¬Oα
for actions α. Such completion rules are in fact necessary, in order to ensure that the rational
status sets can be completed to a two-valued deontic “model” of the program. Applying
F/P -completion does not suffice for this purpose, as shown by the following example.
Example 5.17. Consider the program P :
Pα←
Fα←Oβ
Fα←Wβ
The set S = {Pα,Pβ} is a feasible status of CompF/P (P). However, S cannot be completed
to a deontic model of P , in which Oβ and Wα are true or false, respectively, and such that
the deontic axiom Wα↔¬Oα is satisfied.
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5.7. Optimal status sets
Thus far, we have discussed the following semantics for agent programs: feasible status
sets, rational status sets, reasonable status sets, weak rational status sets, F -preferential
status sets, P -preferential status sets, and complete status sets. Let Sem be a variable
over any of these semantics. Sem chooses certain feasible status sets in keeping with the
philosophical and epistemic principles underlying Sem.
However, in the real world, many choices are made based on the cost of a certain
course of action, as well as the benefits gained by adopting that course of action. For
example, in the case of an automated Purchasing agent for a company, it is quite likely
that Suppliers 1 and 2 charge two different prices for the item that the Plant Agent wishes
to order. Furthermore, as the two suppliers are likely to be located at different locations,
transportation costs are also likely to vary. If one supplier can supply the entire quantity
required, the Purchasing Agent will in all likelihood, select the one whose total cost (cost
of items plus transportation) is lower. Note that this cost is being described in terms of the
costs of the actions being executed in a status set.
However, yet another parameter that needs to be taken into account is the desirability of
the final state that results by executing the Do-actions in a Sem-status set. For example,
the time at which the supplies will arrive at the company is certainly pertinent, but is
not accounted for by the cost parameters listed above. If Supplier 2 will provide the
supplies one day before Supplier 1, then the Purchasing Agent may well choose to go
with Supplier 1, even if Supplier 2’s overall cost is lower.
What the preceding discussion tells us is that we would like to associate with any Sem-
status set, a notion of a cost, and that this cost must take into account, the set of Do-status
atoms in the status set, and the final state that results. This motivates our definition of a
cost function.
Definition 5.15 (Cost function). Suppose S = (TS ,FS) is a body of software code, and
States is the set of all possible states associated with this body of code. Let AB be the set
of all actions. A cost function, cf, is a mapping from (States×2AB) to the nonnegative real
numbers such that:[
(∀s1, s2)(∀A)cf(s1,A)= cf(s2,A)
]
→ [(∀s)(∀A,A′)(A⊆A′ → cf(s,A)6 cf(s,A′))].
The precondition of the above implication basically reflects state independence. A cost
function is state-independent iff for any set A of actions, and any two arbitrarily chosen
states s1, s2, the cost function returns the same value for cf(s1,A) and cf(s2,A). State-
independence implies that the cost function’s values are only affected by the actions taken,
i.e., by the set of actions A.
The above axiom says that for cf to be a cost function, if it is state-independent, then the
values it returns must monotonically increase as the set of actions is enlarged (i.e., as more
actions are taken).
One might wonder whether cost functions should satisfy the stronger condition:
(∀s)(∀A,A′).A⊆A′ → cf(s,A)6 cf(s,A′). (∗)
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The answer is “no”—to see why, consider the situation where executing the actions in A is
cheaper than executing the actions in A′, but this is offset by the fact that the state obtained
by executing the actions in A′ is less desirable than the state obtained by executing the
actions in A.
Alternatively, one might wonder whether cost functions should satisfy the condition:
(∀s1, s2)(∀A). s1 ⊆ s2→ cf(s1,A)6 cf(s2,A). (∗∗)
Again, the answer is no. Executing all actions in A in state s1 may lead to a more desirable
state than doing so in state s2. As an example on the lighter side, consider the action
enter(room). State s1 is empty, state s2 ={in(room,python)}. Clearly, s1 ⊆ s2.
For most of us, executing the action enter(room) in state s1 is vastly preferable to
executing the action enter(room) in state s2.
However, even though not all cost functions should be required to satisfy (∗) and (∗∗),
there will certainly be applications where either (∗) and/or (∗∗) are satisfied. In such cases,
it may turn out to be beneficial computationally to take advantage of properties (∗) and (∗∗)
when computing optimal Sem-status sets defined below.
Definition 5.16 (Weak/strong monotonic cost functions). A cost function is said to be
weakly monotonic, if it satisfies condition (∗) above. It is strongly monotonic, if its satisfies
both conditions (∗) and (∗∗).
We are now ready to come to the definition of optimal status sets.
Definition 5.17 (Optimal Sem-status set). Suppose S = (TS ,FS) is a body of software
code, and OS is the current state. A Sem-status set X is said to be optimal with respect to
cost function cf iff there is no other Sem-status set Y such that
cf(OS , {Doα |Doα ∈ Y }) < cf(OS , {Doα |Doα ∈X}).
Note that the above definition induces different notions of status set, depending on what
Sem is taken to be.
5.8. Feasible status sets and models of logic programs
In this subsection, we describe a transformation AG that takes as input, a logic program
P , and produces as output:
– An action base, all of whose actions have an empty precondition, add list and delete
set;
– An agent program AG(P );
– An empty set of action constraints and an empty set of integrity constraints.
As all components other than the agent program produced by AG(P ) are empty, we will
abuse notation slightly and use AG(P ) to denote the agent program produced by AG.
For each ground instance of a rule r in P of the form
a← b1, . . . , bm,¬c1, . . . ,¬cn
insert the rule
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P(a)← P(b1), . . . ,P(bm),¬P(c1), . . . ,¬P(cn) (8)
in AG(P ). Here, the atoms a, bi , and cj of P are viewed as actions with description
(∅,∅,∅), i.e., they have no precondition and their add and delete sets are both empty. It
is important to note that the only types of status atoms that occur in AG(P ) are of the form
P(−).
Example 5.18. Consider the logic program containing the two rules:
a←
b← a,¬c.
The AG(P ) is the agent program:
P(a)←
P(b)← P(a),¬P(c).
We observe that the logic program has three models. These are given by:
M1 = {a,b},
M2 = {a, c},
M3 = {a,b, c}.
AG(P ) happens to have more than three feasible status sets. These are given by:
F1 = {P(a),P(b)},
F2 = {P(a),P(b),Do(a)},
F3 = {P(a),P(b),Do(b)},
F4 = {P(a),P(b),Do(a),Do(b)},
F5 = {P(a),P(c)},
F6 = {P(a),P(c),Do(a)},
F7 = {P(a),P(c),Do(c)},
F8 = {P(a),P(c),Do(a),Do(c)},
F9 = {P(a),P(b),P(c)},
F10 = {P(a),P(b),P(c),Do(a)},
F11 = {P(a),P(b),P(c),Do(b)},
F12 = {P(a),P(b),P(c),Do(c)},
F13 = {P(a),P(b),P(c),Do(a),Do(b)},
F14 = {P(a),P(b),P(c),Do(a),Do(c)},
F15 = {P(a),P(b),P(c),Do(b),Do(c)},
F16 = {P(a),P(b),P(c),Do(a),Do(b),Do(c)}.
T. Eiter et al. / Artificial Intelligence 108 (1999) 179–255 229
Many further feasible status sets exist, if we take atoms with the other modalities F, O and
W into account.
However, when we examine the above sixteen and all other feasible status sets, and if
we ignore the Do atoms in them, we find only three feasible status sets, namely F1,F5 and
F9. The reader will easily note that the feasible status sets F2,F3,F4 reflect different ways
of determining which actions that are permitted in F1 should actually be done. The same
observation holds with regard to F5 and the feasible status sets F6,F7,F8. Likewise, the
feasible status sets F10, . . . ,F16 are derived from F9 in the same way.
The reader will note that in this example, M1,M2,M3 stand in one one correspondence
to the projections of F1, . . . ,F16 with respect to the modality P, i.e., M1,M2,M3 stand in
one one correspondence with F1,F5 and F9.
The following result shows, conclusively, that this is no accident.
Proposition 5.17. There exists a 1–1 correspondence between the models of P and the
P-projection of the feasible status sets of AG(P ), i.e.
(1) IfM is a model of the program P , then AM = {P(a) | a ∈M} is a feasible status set
of AG(P ).
(2) If A is a feasible status set of AG(P ), then MA = {a | P(a) ∈A, a occurs in P } is a
model of P .
5.9. Rational status sets and minimal models of logic programs
If we return to Example 5.18, we will notice that the logic program P shown there has
two minimal Herbrand models, corresponding to M1,M2, respectively, and the feasible
status sets, F1,F5 correspond to the rational status sets of AG(P ). Intuitively, minimal
Herbrand models of a logic program select models of P that are inclusion-minimal, while
rational status sets select feasible status sets that are also inclusion-minimal. As there is
a 1–1 correspondence between models of P and the P-parts of the feasible status sets of
AG(P ), it follows immediately that the inclusion minimal elements should also be in 1–1
correspondence. The following result is in fact an immediate corollary of Proposition 5.17
and establishes this 1–1 correspondence.
Proposition 5.18. There exists a 1–1 correspondence between the minimal models of P
and the rational status sets of AG(P ), i.e.
(1) If M is a minimal model of the program P , then AM = {P(a) | a ∈M} is a rational
status set of P(P ).
(2) If A is a rational status set of AG(P ), then MA = {a | P(a) ∈A, a occurs in P } is a
minimal model of P .
When taken in conjunction with results of Lobo and Subrahmanian [60], the above result
implies that there exists a translation T (given in [60]) such that the rational status sets of
AG(P ) correspond exactly to the extensions of a prerequisite free normal default theory
T (P).
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5.10. Reasonable status sets and stable semantics
In this section, we show that the reasonable status sets of AG(P ) correspond to the
stable models of P . Before stating this main result formally, let us return to the case of
Example 5.18.
Example 5.19. It is easy to see that the logic program P of Example 5.18 has exactly one
stable model, namely M1. It is easy to see that AG(P ) program has a unique reasonable
status set, which is RS1 = {P(a),P(b)}. As Proposition 5.19 below will show, this is not an
accident.
The following result explicitly states this.
Proposition 5.19. There exists a 1–1 correspondence between the stable models of P and
the reasonable status sets of AG(P ), i.e.
(1) IfM is a stable model of the program P , then AM = {P(a) | a ∈M} is a reasonable
status set of AG(P ).
(2) If A is a reasonable status set of P(P ), then MA = {a | P(a) ∈A, a occurs in P } is
a stable model of P .
It is important to observe that by this correspondence, we obtain some complexity
results on reasonable status sets. This is because the complexity results known for
nonmonotonic logic programs with stable model semantics [45,66] imply lower bounds
for agent programs using reasonable status sets.
5.11. Discussion
Thus far, in this section, we have shown that given any logic program P , we can convert
P into an agent program , AG(P ), (together with associated action base and empty sets of
integrity constraints and action constraints) such that:
(1) the P-parts of feasible status sets are in 1–1 correspondence with the models of P ;
(2) rational status sets are in 1–1 correspondence with the minimal models of P ;
(3) reasonable status sets are in 1–1 correspondence with the stable models of P .
The above results, when taken in conjunction with known results linking logic programs
and nonmonotonic reasoning, provide connections with well known nonmonotonic logics
as well. For example, the following results are well known:
– Marek and Truszczynski [66] prove 1–1 correspondences between stable models of
logic programs and extensions of default logic theories.
– Marek and Subrahmanian [65] and Marek and Truszczynski [66] prove 1–1 corre-
spondences between stable models of logic programs and appropriate types of expan-
sions of auto-epistemic theories.
– Lobo and Subrahmanian [60] prove 1–1 correspondences between minimal models of
logic programs, and extensions of prerequisite-free normal default logic theories.
– Ben-Eliyahu and Dechter [16] have proved that stable models and minimal models of
logic programs may be viewed as models of a suitable logical theory.
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An important topic that we have not addressed (due to space restrictions) is whether there
exists a transformation ℘ that takes as input, an agent state, action base, an agent program,
a set of integrity constraints, and a set of action constraints, and produces as output a
logic program such that the above equivalences hold. This is somewhat complicated to do
because the use of arbitrary agent states over arbitrary data structures means that classical
model semantics, minimal model semantics, and stable semantics cannot be used directly.
Rather, the notion of models over arbitrary data structures introduced by Lu et al. [62] must
be used. For this reason, we defer this to further work.
However, we remark that for feasible and rational status sets, no 1–1 correspondence
to the models and minimal models, respectively, of a polynomial-time constructible logic
program similar as above is possible in general: An agent program may lack a feasible or
rational status set (even in absence of integrity constraints), while a logic program always
has some model and minimal model; existence of a feasible as well as a rational status set
for an agent program is NP-hard, even for agent programs without integrity constraints (see
Part II of this series of papers [31]). Furthermore, since computing a model (respectively,
minimal model) of a logic program is in FNP (respectively, FNP// log), it is not possible to
polynomially reduce the FΣP2 -hard computation of a rational status set of a general agent
program to the computation of a model (respectively, minimal model) of a polynomial
time-constructible logic program, unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses. In particular,
no polynomial-time constructible logic program exists whose minimal models correspond
1–1 to the rational status sets of a general agent program. Observe that from the complexity
side, a 1–1 correspondency between reasonable status sets of an agent program and the
stable models of a polynomial-time constructible logic program is not excluded; in fact, a
rather natural translation seems feasible.
6. Related work
During the last few years, there has been an explosion in the area of agent based
research. This section is divided into four parts—in the first part, we provide a detailed
comparison of our work with Shoham’s AGENT-0 language [92]. Then, in Section 6.2,
we provide a detailed comparison between our framework and languages such as the
branching time temporal logic based languages advocated by Rao and Georgeff [77]. In
Section 6.3, we provide a detailed comparison between our framework and the deontic
logic based framework for agent based programming proposed by Meyer’s group [28,49,
99], and compare it in Section 6.4 to approaches in the area of deontic logic programming
[69,84,100]. Finally, in Section 6.5, we provide a comparison with other proposals for
agent programming and outline directions for future work.
6.1. Shoham’s AGENT-0
Shoham [92] was perhaps the first to propose an explicit programming language for
agents, based on object oriented concepts, and based on the concept of an agent state. As
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recalled in Section 4, Shoham [92, Section 3] states that a complete AOP (“agent oriented
programming”) system will have three components.
(1) a restricted formal language for describing mental state;
(2) an interpreted agent programming language with primitive commands such as
REQUEST and INFORM; and,
(3) an “agentifier”.
We have provided in Section 4 a detailed description of how the framework described
in this paper supports agentification, which Shoham did not address. This is a significant
contribution of our paper, over and above Shoham’s important advances.
Shoham’s paper concentrated on the second problem listed above, and he developed a
language called AGENT-0 to support this. In this section, we restrict our comments to the
differences between our framework and AGENT-0.
In AGENT-0, actions are either private or communicative. Modalities used in AGENT-
0 are DO and REFRAIN, while INFORM and REQUEST are communicative actions. The
mechanism that the agent uses to act in AGENT-0 is through rules having the form
(If 〈mental-condition〉 action)
where 〈mental-condition〉 is a Boolean combination of formulas “Bfact” and “CMT a ac-
tion.” Here, CMT intuitively stands for “commit” which has the same intended meaning
[92, p. 72] as our “obligatory” or O modality. In addition, specific syntax is used to handle
messages, in much the same way as the msgbox domain described in this paper.
An agent programmed within AGENT-0 can be intuitively transformed into an agent
program as described in this paper, through the following mechanism.
(1) As all mental conditions of the agent are evaluated over the agent’s mental state,
create a body of software code (in the strict sense of this paper) called mental.
Add appropriate code calls to this mental state manager.
(2) Now, every rule of the form “(If 〈mental-condition〉Mα)” where α is an action and
M is one of DO, REFRAIN, INFORM, REQUEST, can be converted into an agent
program rule as follows:
Doα←mental-condition, if M= DO;
Fα←mental-condition, if M= REFRAIN;
Dosend
(
a,b,′requestα′
)←mental-condition, if M= REQUEST;
Dosend
(
a,b,′informα′
)←mental-condition, if M= INFORM.
It is important to note that in AGENT-0, the only modalities that can appear in the head
of a rule are F and Do. In contrast, agent programs allow several other modalities in the
heads of rules. Furthermore, agent programs allow all the modalities Do,F,P,O to appear
in rule bodies—positively or negatively—which is not the case with AGENT-0 programs.
In view of the above informal embedding of AGENT-0 programs into Agent Programs as
introduced in this paper, we may say that our paper builds upon Shoham’s important ideas
in the following ways. First, we provide a formal semantics (actually, several semantics)
for agent programs, and by virtue of the above embedding, our paper also provides several
alternative semantics for Shoham’s AGENT-0 language which has hitherto not had a formal
semantics. Second, we allow arbitrary notions of concurrency to be associated with any
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agent. Third, we allow integrity constraints and action constraints, thus building further
upon languages like AGENT-0. Fourth, we provide a set of algorithms and complexity
results for such programs in Part II of this series of papers [31]. Fifth, we provide a concrete
syntax for building agents on top of arbitrary data structure and Shoham’s language
of mental states can be extended easily with this syntax. In contrast, Shoham’s elegant
characterization of mental states may be used to define a body of software code that can be
attached to any agent program as defined in this paper. Shoham also provides a specification
of an interpreter for agent programs that we benefit from.
6.2. BDI framework
It has been well recognized in AI that agents reason based on beliefs (B), their goals or
desires (D), and their intentions (I). Intuitively, according to Bratman [18], intentions are
plans (partial or total) that an agent has committed to perform so as to accomplish its goals
or desires. An architecture centering on these themes called the BDI-architecture for agents
was proposed by Bratman [18,19] and by Cohen and Levesque [23] and further developed
by Rao and Georgeff [77].
The fact that the world evolves over time led BDI-researchers to model the evolution
of the world through a tree. Nodes at level i in the tree reflect the different possible states
of the world at time i . At any given point t in time, the agent knows its current state, but
does not know how the world will evolve in the future. Thus, the reasoning of the agent is
modeled through a branching time temporal logic such as Computation Tree Logic (CTL)
[33]. These logics include specialized operators such as “eventually p” and “always p”.
In initial work on CTL and its variants, researchers assume that each node represents a
state which is “objective” (i.e., represents a set of ground atoms true in the current world).
Extensions of these logics have been developed to handle probabilistic data [6].
Cohen and Levesque [23] extend the generic branching time temporal logic framework
as follows. Instead of assuming (as in [33]) that each state is a set of “objective” (i.e.,
modality free) atoms, they assume that each state is itself a time-line consisting of a
sequence of events both in the past and in the future. In effect, suppose we are at node
N and suppose the time-line associated with node N is a function `N . The `N(i) specifies
what is believed by the agent to be true at time i , given that the agent is currently at node
N . This formulation allows the agent’s beliefs to change over time.
Rao and Georgeff [77] generalize this further. They allow each node to contain a time-
tree, instead of a time line. Thus, given a node N , they have an associated tree, treeN ,
which specifies what the agent believes (at node N ) will hold in the future. Each time tree
allows the agent, once it is in the belief-state captured by nodeN , to reason about different
possible futures, and make a choice about which of these different possible futures it wants
to try to steer towards, based on its goals (desires). Rao and Georgeff [77] develop a syntax
and a model theory based on this intuition, and define a set of axioms that may be used
by a proof procedure for their logic. These axioms are sound, but completeness is not
established.
Philosophically, our paper is very different from the BDI architecture in that we do not,
in this paper, deal with planning and/or plan objects. Instead, in our paper, we provide a
mechanism (Agent Programs) through which the agent can decide what actions to perform
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now, based on the declarative specification of the agent’s behavior stated in the agent
program. Thus, our framework can be used to implicitly specify a tree of the kinds described
above in the following way: Given an agent program P , a set IC of integrity constraints,
a set AC of action constraints, and an initial agent state s0, define a tree in the following
way:
– Each node in the tree is labeled with a pair (m, s) where m is a set of messages and s
is a state;
– The root of the tree is labeled with ({}, s0);
– Each edge in the tree is labeled with a set of actions;
– If there is an edge in the tree of the form (m, s) AH⇒ (m′, s′) then
• there exists a Sem-status set S of P with respect to the state s? which is just like s
except that the messages m′ replace m and A= {α | Doα ∈ S} (where Sem is the
selected semantics of agent programs);
• the concurrent execution of the actions in A in state s? leads to the state s′.
However, we do not specify how to reason about the global properties of such trees—
this is well done in CTL-like languages, and we have not specified, as is done by Rao
and Georgeff [77] and Cohen and Leveseque [23] how the structure of this tree may be
generalized.
6.3. Hindriks et al.’s agent programs
Hindriks et al. [49] also have a proposal similar to ours in spirit. In their framework, an
agent’s mental state consists of a set of goals and a set of beliefs. An agent program in
their framework consists of a quadruple (T ,Π0, σ0,Γ ) where T is a transition function
specifying the effects of basic actions, Π0 is an initial set of goals, σ0 is an initial set of
beliefs, and Γ is a set of rules of the form
Head←Guard | Body.
In general, Head is a (potentially) complex formula describing a goal. The syntax of goals
supported by Hindriks et al. [49] allows goals to be elementary actions, but also includes
sequential compositions of actions, disjunctive goals, and/or conjunctive goals. The Guard
is a logical formula, while the Body has the same structure as the head.
– The language of [49] is richer than ours in some respects—this is particularly true
because complex actions can appear in the heads of rules. In contrast, in our paper, no
such complex actions are considered.
– In addition, as stated in [49, p. 219], a request to achieve a goal G can be encoded
through a rule with G in the head and whose body is a “recipe” to accomplish G.
There is no direct analog for this in our framework.
– In contrast, our language is richer than that of [49] in some other ways.
• First, we provide a well defined, and practically realized and tested method for
building agents on top of heterogeneous data structures. (For example, Schafer
et al. [86] describe an application of our theory to build a Virtual Operations
Center for the US Army’s Logistics Integration Agency that computes joins across
heterogeneous data sources involving billions of tuples.) This same syntax can be
incorporated within the guards of the [49] framework to extend their approach.
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• Second, in our language, we explicitly allow deontic modalities to appear in Agent
Programs, which is not allowed in the [49] framework. As a consequence, we can
write rules specifying the operational principles underlying an agent’s behavior
and this allows an agent program to nondeterministically choose what actions to
execute.
• Third, our framework contains explicit constructs for integrity constraints and
action constraints that limit the set of what states are allowed to exist, and what
actions are concurrently executable. These are new contributions.
• Fourth, once an agent has selected a status set of the appropriate type, we allow
any notion of concurrency to be used to execute these actions. This could include
sequential composition or parallel composition as allowed in [49]. But it could also
include composing a set of actions to produce a completely “new” action not drawn
from the set that reflects the amalgam of these actions being composed.
• Fifth, by building our framework in a generic way, we have developed a hierarchy of
successively more complex semantics that an agent developer can pick and choose
from for his application. These semantics may be polynomial for some applications,
while they may be more complex for other applications. The application should
determine which semantics should be used. These complexity results are discussed
in detail in Part II of this paper. In addition, some of our semantics (e.g., the optimal
status set semantics) are very natural to use for many applications, and have no
obvious counterparts in [49].
Our framework can benefit from that of [49]. In particular, the important idea of allowing
complex actions to be directly programmed into Agent Program rules is something we are
currently exploring, through the use of Hierarchical Task Network actions.
6.4. Deontic logic programming
Several formalizations of deontic action languages were proposed using techniques from
logic programming. We consider here the approaches described in [69,84,100].
Ryu and Lee [84] develop a deontic system on top of Nute’s [75] defeasible reasoning
framework. Their language has rules
φ←ψ1, . . . ,ψn φ⇐ψ1, . . . ,ψn
for strict and defeasible rules, respectively, where φ and the ψi are literals. Deontic
operators “oblig(α)” and “forbid(α)” are applicable to actions α; taking an action is
expressed by “perform(α)”. Further operators on actions are available. The semantics of
these operators is captured by a set of rules, which are added to the program. Queries
posed to the system are answered by evaluating the augmented program under Nute’s
SLD resolution-style algorithm [75]. Negation is treated by considering negative literals
as defeasibly obtained, i.e., true by default.
Clearly, the system in [84] is fundamentally different from ours. It is a PROLOG-like,
goal-oriented query-answering system, rather than a pure declarative action specification
language as ours. Furthermore, concurrent execution of actions, including different
execution ontologies, and integrity/action constraints are not addressed.
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In [100], van der Meyden proposes a system which applies techniques of logic
programming to a deontic specification language. It has action and propositional constants,
which can be combined to more complex formulas using standard connectives and deontic
operators P and pi , as well as further temporal operators for statements about the future
to which action execution results. Intuitively, P(α) can be read as “it is not prohibited to
bring it about that α”, while pi(α) reads “it is permitted to do α” (i.e., executing α and
further actions implied results in a permitted state). Programs consist of Horn clauses in
the language. For example,
P(owns(y, z))⇒ transferable(z, y)
expresses the predicate “z is legally transferable to y”, which holds just when some action
resulting in y’s ownership of z is permitted [100]. For the Horn clause fragment, a Kripke-
style semantics is given which using a monotone operator T singles out the least model of
a program in the class of Tree Kripke models. A tableaux proof theory, sketched in [100],
may be used to build a top-down interpreter in the style of SLD resolution.
Compared to our agent programs, the framework in [100] allows for more complex
statements about actions (including nested modalities), and temporal operators (resorting
to dynamic logic) are available. On the other hand, not all deontic operators are available;
most noticeably, van der Meyden’s language lacks a concept of obligation. The system has
thus the flavor of a process logic tailored for sequences of possible actions. Our status set
semantics is of a different nature, aiming at instantaneous decision taking. This may involve
nondeterministic choice and compositionality of actions—which is excluded in [100] but
represented in our framework. Furthermore, the language of [100] disallows negation in
rule bodies [100]. A simple extension by negation as failure may be possible [100], but
will hardly assign a satisfactory semantics to all programs.
McCarty [69] describes a deontic action language, combining the action language in
[70] and his pioneering deontic language [68], which emerged from the TAXMAN project
[67]. It has deontic operators similar as ours. McCarty develops an intuitionistic logic for
this language based on events, which paired with an agent represent actions. Informally,
an event α(t1, t2) is a predicate which is brought about to hold between points t1 and t2 in
time. A modal atom P〈α, c〉 intuitively expresses that action α is permitted to agent c as a
“free choice permission”, which means that all ways to perform α are permitted to her. The
reading of O〈α, c〉 is as usual, while the reading of F〈α, c〉 is that all ways of performing α
are forbidden. An atom DO〈α, c〉 expresses that α is somehow carried out by the agent c.
Deontic rules take the form of Horn clauses; for example,
O(TransferDollars(c, b, d, t), c)⇐Month(t)
informally may express that on the beginning of a month t , agent c (representing a
corporation) must transfer d dollars (e.g., interests) to a bank b [69]. McCarty develops
a Kripke-style semantics for his language guided by [68,70], and explores the use of
intuitionistic proof procedures for fragments of the language; a proof theory for the full
language is announced for a forthcoming paper.
McCarty’s language is richer than ours. It is a multi-agent modal language, allows to
relate actions through logical connectives, and incorporates time. The DO operator has
similar properties to ours: obligation implies (under strict regimentation) action execution,
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and doing an action while it is forbidden is inconsistent. However, similar as in van der
Meyden’s language, negation in rule bodies is treated as negation by failure, and ontologies
for concurrent actions are not considered. Moreover, preference-based decision making
is not discussed. Compared to our status sets semantics, the one in [69] is much more
involved. For a full grasp by the agent language user, a proof theory seems indispensable.
Note that, by the results established in Sections 5.8–5.10, status sets are related to other
nonmonotonic languages which are well-understood [66].
6.5. Other approaches
In this section, we will briefly compare our work with wide variety of agent research.
Agent decision making. There has been a significant amount of work on agent decision
making. Rosenschein [81] was perhaps the first to say that agents act according to states,
and which actions they take are determined by rules of the form “When P is true of the
state of the environment, then the agent should take action A”. As the reader can easily
see, our framework builds upon this intuitive idea, though (i) our notion of state is defined
very generally and (ii) agent programs have a richer set of rules than those listed above.
Rosenschein and Kaelbling [82] extend this framework to provide a basis for such actions
in terms of situated automata theory.
Bratman et al. [19] define the IRMA system which uses similar ideas to generate plans.
In their framework, different possible courses of actions (Plans) are generated, based on the
agent’s intentions. These plans are then evaluated to determine which ones are consistent
and optimal with respect to achieving these intentions.
Verharen et al. [102] present a language-action approach to agent decision making,
which has some similarities to our effort. However, they do not develop any formal
semantics for their work, and their language for agent programs uses a linguistic rather
than a logical approach. Schoppers and Shapiro [87] describe techniques to design agents
that optimize objective functions—such objective functions are similar to the cost functions
we have described.
One effort that is close to ours is Singh’s approach [93]. Like us, he is concerned about
heterogeneity in agents, and he develops a theory of agent interactions through workflow
diagrams. Intuitively, in this framework, an agent is viewed as a finite state automaton—
as is well known, finite state automata can be easily encoded in logic. This makes our
framework somewhat more general than Singh’s, instead of explicitly encoding automata
(hard to do when an agent has hundreds of ground actions it can take). Sycara and Zeng [97]
provide a coordinated search methodology for multiple agents. Haddadi [47] develops
a declarative theory of interactions, as do Rao and Georgeff [77], and Coradeschi and
Karlson [25] who build agents for air traffic simulation.
There has been extensive work on negotiation in multiagent systems, based on the initial
idea of contract nets, due to Smith and Davis [94]. In this paradigm, an agent seeking a
service invites bids from other agents, and selects the bid that most closely matches its
own. Schwartz and Kraus [88] present a model of agent decision making where one agent
invites bids (this is an action!) and others evaluate the bids (another action) and respond;
this kind of behavior is encodable through agent programs together with underlying data
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structures. This body of work is complementary to ours: an agent negotiates by taking
certain actions in accordance with its negotiation strategy, while we provide the “hooks” to
include such actions within our framework, but do not explicitly study how the negotiation
actions are performed, as this has been well done by others [88,94].
Coalition formation mechanisms where agents dynamically team up with other agents
has been intensely studied by many researchers [85,89,107]. Determining which agents to
team with is a sort of decision making capability. Inverno et al. [29] present a framework
for dMARS based on the BDI model. Like us, they assume a state space, and the fact that
actions cause state transitions. Labrou and Finin [58] develop the semantics of KQML, but
do not explicitly present an action language.
Reasoning about actions. Several works [9–11,40] have addressed the problem of
modeling the logic of actions by means of logic programming languages. In this section, we
briefly address these, one by one. Gelfond and Lifschitz [40] propose a logic programming
language called A using which, users may express knowledge about actions and their
effects. This framework was later extended by Baral, Gelfond and others in a series of
elegant papers [7,8,10,11]. The languageA allows users to make statements of the form
f after a1, . . . , am
initially f
a causes f if p1, . . . ,pn.
Intuitively, the first statement says that executing actions a1, . . . , am makes f true
(afterwards). Likewise, the second statement says f was true in the initial state, and the
third statement describes the effect of a on f if certain preconditions are satisfied.
The key differences between our approach and this genre of work are the following. (1)
First and foremost, our approach applies to heterogeneous data sources, while this body
of work assumes all data is stored in the form of logical atoms. (2) Second, the modalities
for determining what is permitted, what is forbidden, what is obligatory, what is done, are
not treated in the above body of work. (3) Third, in our approach, we use the semantics to
determine which set of firable actions (in a state) must actually be fired, and this policy of
choosing such sets of actions in accordance with the policies expressed in an agent program
and the underlying integrity constraints is different from what is done in [7,8,10,11,40].
Collaborative problem solving. There has also been extensive work on collaborative
problem solving and negotiation in multiagent systems (e.g., [24,51,54,80,103]). As our
approach allows arbitrary decisions, and as negotiation is one form of decision making,
our work provides a framework within which various negotiation strategies described in
the literature can be encoded. Agents can collaborate if they wish, but again, collaboration
is an explicit action, and the rules governing such collaborations can be encoded as rules
within agent programs.
Agent architectures. For an excellent anthology of classic works on agent systems, see
[50]. There have been numerous proposals for agentization in the literature (e.g., [17,
36,44]) which have been broadly classified by Genesereth and Ketchpel [41] into four
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categories: In the first category, each agent has an associated “transducer” that converts
all incoming messages and requests into a form that is intelligible to the agent. This is
clearly not what happens in IMPACT—as noted in [41], the transducer has to anticipate
what other agents will send us and translate that—something which is clearly difficult
to do. The second approach is based on wrappers which “inject code into a program to
allow it to communicate” [41, p. 51]. The IMPACT architecture provides a language (the
service description language) for expressing such wrappers, together with accompanying
algorithms. The third approach described in [41] is to completely rewrite the code
implementing an agent which is obviously a very expensive alternative. Last but not least,
there is the mediation approach proposed by Wiederhold [104], which assumes that all
agents will communicate with a mediator which in turn may send messages to other agents.
In contrast, our framework allows point to point communication between agents without
having to go through a mediator. Of course, none of these efforts explicitly address agent
decision making in heterogeneous environments, which is the focus of our effort.
Matchmaking. First, there has been substantial work on matchmaking, in which agents
advertise their services, and matchmakers match an agent requesting a service with one (or
more) that provides it. Kuokka and Harada [56] present the SHADE and COINS systems
for matchmaking. Decker, Sycara, and Williamson [27] present matchmakers that store
capability advertisements of different agents. Arisha et al. [5] developed a mechanism
for matchmaking based on a similarity metric between a stored capability description,
and a requested capability. In [76], Papakonstantinou and Vassalos provided an extremely
expressive, Datalog-style language for describing the capabilities of different data sources
and agents. Recently, Sycara et al. [96] have designed a system called LARKS that merges,
and extends the ideas of similarity based inexact retrieval, and capability description
languages. This paper, in contrast, merely focuses on how an agent makes decisions, rather
than determining how one agent “matches” up with another.
Relationship to heterogeneous data integration in the database community. There is now
a great deal of work in mediated systems techniques. In this paragraph, we merely explain
the relationship between code call conditions and existing work on data and software
integration.
For example, there have been several efforts to integrate multiple relational DBMSs
[26,73] and relational DBMSs, object-oriented DBMSs and/or file systems [37,53,90].
However, to date, the semantics of mediators that take actions has not been explored.
The work in this paper builds upon mediation efforts reported upon in our HERMES
effort described previously in [20,62,64,95]. The Stanford TSIMMIS project [22] effort
aimed at integrating a wide variety of heterogeneous databases, together with a free text
indexing system. In contrast, HERMES integrated arbitrary software packages such as
an Army Terrain Route Planning System, Jim Hendler’s UM Nonlin planning system, a
face recognition system, a video reasoning system, and various mathematical programming
software packages are integrated currently into Hermes. As a consequence, TSIMMIS was
able to take advantage of its focus on integrating databases to perform some optimizations
which HERMES was unable to incorporate, but conversely, HERMES was able to access
many data sources that TSIMMIS could not. Query optimization methods applicable to
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both TSIMMIS and HERMES were studied in [1]. The SIMS system [4] at USC uses
a LISP-like syntax to integrate multiple databases as well. It is closely related to the
HERMES effort. HERMES used minimalistic versions of logic to integrate data and
software, while SIMS used a somewhat richer language. As a consequence, HERMES was
able to take advantage of very efficient caching and query optimization methods [1,61], but
may have not been able to easily express some of the more sophisticated reasoning tasks
desired by the authors of SIMS. Other important later directions on mediation include the
InfoSleuth effort [13] at MCC.
7. Conclusions and future work
In this paper, we have argued the following two simple points:
(I) Agents in the real world manipulate not just logical formulas, but complex data
types, that vary from one application to another.
(II) Agents must be able to act in accordance with a specific, declarative action policy
that governs their actions. It must be possible to build such a declarative policy on
top of the existing data structures that the agent’s implemented imperative software
code manipulates.
Towards this end, we have developed the concept of an agent state, that can consist
of instantiations of arbitrary data structures. We then develop the concept of an agent
program, building on top of work in deontic logic. Agent programs allow the designer
of an agent to specify how an agent should act, and take into account the following
aspects. What is the agent obliged to do? What is the agent permitted to do? What is
the agent forbidden from doing? and so on. We have developed a theoretical framework
within which agent programs can be built on top of arbitrary pieces of software code,
and we have developed a series of successively more refined declarative semantics for
agent programs. As the declarative semantics for agent programs become intuitively more
appealing, they (with some exceptions) also become computationally more complex. We
have further established results showing the relationship between the declarative semantics
and computational complexity, which are described in Part II of this series of papers [31].
Our complexity results also, for the most part, include algorithms to compute the relevant
semantical structures.
Our semantical results are closely related to other research in the field of artificial
intelligence. In particular, we have demonstrated that three well-known semantics for
logic programs, namely the model semantics, minimal model semantics, and the stable
model semantics, are captured within our agent program framework. These semantics
are well-known to correspond to certain fragments of advanced knowledge representation
frameworks such as default logic and circumscription.
Last, but not least, we have developed a simulation of the working of our agent
framework in the area of supply chain management. In the simulation, we have built several
agents on top of legacy commercial software including Microsoft Access database agents,
and ESRI MapObject agents as well.
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Our current and ongoing efforts focus on the following subjects:
– We are extending the semantical framework described here to accommodate the
following types of reasoning not currently included: (a) reasoning about uncertain
agent states, (b) reasoning about temporal actions, where an agent makes decisions
on taking an action in the future, (c) reasoning about other agent’s reasoning. All of
these modes of reasoning are well recognized in the AI community, and expanding
our semantical framework to accommodate these modes of reasoning is an important
semantical issue.
– We are exploring alternative possibilities to the STRIPS-like action model. In
particular, a replacement of STRIPS style actions with Hierarchical Task Network
actions might be desirable, since this allows for representing complex actions.
However, the resulting theory is much more complex.
– We are currently developing a compiler for agent programs—in particular, in a future
paper [32], we will report upon a class of agent programs called regular agent
programs that are guaranteed to possess reasonable status sets—regularity of agent
programs is a syntactically easily verifiable property, and regular agent programs
possess many nice computational properties. The paper [32] will report upon several
experiments evaluating the ease of computing the several diverse semantics described
in this paper. This implementation builds upon our existing HERMES Heterogeneous
Reasoning and Mediator System, reported on in [20,64,95].
– We are studying the problem of whether all agent programs (under different
semantics) can be embedded into logic programs. In other words, is there a translation
℘ that takes as input, an agent program P , and produces as output, a logic program
℘(P) such that there is a one one correspondence between appropriate status sets of
P and appropriate models of ℘(P)?
– Suppose we choose to use Sem-status set semantics for agent programs, where Sem
is any of the semantics introduced in this paper. At any given point t in time, the agent
program has a Sem-status set, St that it acts on. When new events occur (e.g., new
messages arrive), these events may be viewed as updates to the current agent state.
We would like to incrementally compute a new status set St+1 from St , the object
state immediately after the Do-actions in St are executed, and the updates. We are
developing algorithms for this task.
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Appendix A. Complexity of S- and F -concurrent executability
The following two theorems, which state the complexity of S-concurrent and F -
concurrent action executability, together with the polynomiality of weakly-concurrent
execution establish Theorem 3.1.
Theorem A.1. Let AS= {(α1, θ1, γ1), . . . , (αn, θn, γn)} be a given set of feasible execution
triples (αi, θi, γi) on a given agent stateOS . Then, under the assumptions in Theorem 3.1,
testing whether AS is S-concurrently executable is NP-complete.
Proof. The problem is NP, since we can guess an appropriate permutation pi and check
in polynomial time whether AS is pi -feasible. Indeed, by our assumptions we can always
evaluate the precondition Pre(α( EXpi(i))θpi(i)γpi(i)) in polynomial time on OiS , and we can
construct the state Oi+1S in polynomial time fromOiS , for all i = 0, . . . , n− 1; overall, this
is possible in polynomial time.
To show NP-hardness, we provide a reduction from a restriction of the satisfiability
problem (SAT). Recall that SAT is the following problem: Given a formula φ =∧mi=1Ci
which is the conjunction of propositional clauses Ci such that each clause Ci is a
disjunction Ci = Li,1 ∨ · · · ∨ Li,ki of literals over propositional atoms X = {x1, . . . , xn},
decide whether φ is satisfiable. It is well-known that SAT is an NP-complete problem.
This remains true if we assume that each clause Ci contains three literals, and either the
literals Li,1,Li,2,Li,3 are all positive, or they are all negative; this restriction is known as
monotone 3SAT (M3SAT) [35].
For the reduction to our problem, we suppose that the software code S provides access
to a relational database DB and that an agent state OS is a relational database instance D.
Let I be an instance of M3SAT, consisting of clauses C1, . . . ,Cm over variables
x1, . . . , xn.
The database DB has four relations: VAL(Var,BV), which stores a Boolean value for
each variable; SV(Var), which intuitively holds the variables which have assigned a value;
SAT(C) which intuitively stores the clauses which are satisfied; and, the 0-ary relation
INIT.
The initial database DB holds all possible tuples; in particular, both tuples (xi,0) and
(xi,1) are in VAL for every atom xi . This will ensure that every execution triple in AS is
feasible.
The execution triples in AS are designed such that a feasible schedule must have the
following phases:
Initialization. An action init must be executed here, which clears all relations except
VAL.
Choice. In this phase, for each atom xi a truth value is chosen by removing from VAL
either (xi,0) (which sets xi to 1), or (xi,1) (which sets xi to 0).
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Checking. In this phase, it is checked for every single clause Ci independently whether
Ci is satisfied.
Success. In this phase, the single tests for the Ci are combined; if the result is positive,
i.e., the assignment selected in the choice phase satisfies every Ci , then a success action
sat is executed which enables to gracefully execute the remaining actions.
Clearance. In this phase, which is entered only if the Success phase had a positive result,
all remaining actions which have not been executed so far are taken. Moreover, we add
an action which completely clears the database, such that every feasible permutation pi
leads to the empty database.
The actions and their descriptions are given in the Table A.1. There Ati,j = VAL(xk,1)
if the j th literal of clause Ci is xk , and Ati,j = VAL(xk,0) if it is ¬xk . Observe that all
variables in the preconditions of the above actions α are action parameters. Thus, γ is void
in every solution of Pre(α( EXθ)), and thus for every α( EX) and θ at most one feasible triple
(α( EX), θ, γ ) may exist, in which γ is void; we hence write simply α( EXθ) for this triple.
Let the set AS be as follows:
AS= {set1(xi),set0(xi) | 16 i 6 n} ∪
{checki,j | 16 i 6m,16 j 6 3} ∪ {init,clear,sat}.
Notice the following observations on a feasible permutation pi for AS:
– init must be executed first, i.e., αpi(1) = init, and clear must be executed as the
last action.
Table A.1
Actions in the proof of NP-hardness of S-concurrent executability
Phase Action Precondition
Init init INIT
Choice set1(X) VAL(X,1)∧VAL(X,0)
set0(X) VAL(X,1) ∧VAL(X,0)
Checking checki,j SV(x1)∧ · · · ∧ SV(xn)∧Ati,j
Success sat SAT(c1)∧ · · · ∧ SAT(cm)
Clearance clear true
Phase Action Add set Delete set
Init init ∅ {SV(V ), SAT(C), INIT}
Choice set1(X) {SV(X)} {INIT, VAL(X,0)}
set0(X) {SV(X)} {INIT, VAL(X,1)}
Checking checki,j {SAT(ci)} {INIT}
Success sat {VAL(xi,0), VAL(xi,1) | i = 1, . . . , n} {INIT}
Clearance clear ∅ all relations
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– Clause checking can only be done after some choice action setv(xi), v ∈ {0,1}, has
occurred, for every i = 1, . . . , n.
– In the choice phase, execution of at most one of the actions set1(xi), set0(xi) is
possible, for every i = 1, . . . , n.
– Success is only possible, if for each clause Ci at least one action checki,j has been
executed.
– After the Success phase, first every remaining action setv(xi) can be executed, then
all remaining actions checki,j are possible, and finally clear can be done.
It holds that AS is S-concurrently executable, i.e., there exists some permutation pi such
that AS is pi -feasible, if and only if I is a Yes-Instance of M3SAT. 2
Remark. The construction can be extended so to obtain a fixed action base AB such that
the set AS in the construction is an instance of AB, by adding further relations to the
schema describing the clauses in I . Moreover, strict typing of the values occurring in the
relations is possible.
Theorem A.2. Let AS= {(α1, θ1, γ1), . . . , (αn, θn, γn)} be a given set of feasible execution
triples (αi, θi, γi) on a given agent stateOS . Then, under the assumptions in Theorem 3.1,
testing whether AS is F -concurrently executable is co-NP-complete.
Proof. The problem is in co-NP, since we can guess permutations pi and pi ′ such that
either AS[pi] = αpi(1), . . . , αpi(n) or AS[pi ′] = αpi ′(1), . . . , αpi ′(n) is not feasible, or AS[pi]
and AS[pi ′] yield a different result. By the assumptions, the guess for Π and Π ′ can be
verified in polynomial time (cf. proof of Theorem A.1).
To show that the problem is co-NP-hard, we consider as in the proof of Theorem A.1
the case where S is a relational database D and an agent state OS is a relational database
instance D.
We reduce the complement of M3SAT to F -concurrent executability checking. Let I
be an instance of M3SAT, i.e., a CNF φ =∧i Ci in variables x1, . . . , xn. Without loss of
generality, φ has at least one positive clause and at least one negative clause.
Let I ′ be the instance of I which results if every positive clause is made negative and
vice versa, and if every atom xi is replaced by xn+i . Clearly, I ′ is a Yes-Instance if and
only if I is a Yes-instance, if and only if I ∪ I ′ is satisfied by some truth assignment to
x1, . . . , x2n in which xi has the opposite value to the value of xn+i , for every i = 1, . . . , n.
The relational database D we construct has four relations: POS(V1,V2,V3) and
NEG(V1,V2,V3), which serve for storing the positive and negative clauses of I ∪ I ′,
respectively; VAL(Var,BV), which stores a truth value assignment to the variables, such
that variable xi is true if (xi,1) ∈ VAL, and xi is false if (xi,0) ∈ VAL, for every
i = 1, . . . ,2n; and, a 0-ary relation UNSAT.
The initial databaseD contains the relations POS and NEG storing the clauses of I ∪ I ′,
the relation VAL which holds the tuples (xi,0) and (xn+i ,1), for every i = 1, . . . , n and
the relation UNSAT is empty.
The action base contains the actions switch(X,Y ) and eval, where
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switch: Pre(switch(X,Y ))= true,
Add(switch(X,Y ))= {VAL(X,1),VAL(Y,0)},
Del(switch(X,Y ))= {VAL(X,0),VAL(X,1)};
eval: Pre(eval)={
∃V1,V2,V3.POS(V1,V2,V3)∧VAL(V1,0)∧VAL(V2,0)∧VAL(V3,0)∧
∃V1,V2,V3.NEG(V1,V2,V3)∧VAL(V1,1)∧VAL(V2,1)∧VAL(V3,1)
}
,
Add(eval)= {UNSAT},
Del(eval)= ∅.
Observe that all variables in preconditions of actions are bound; we thus write (α( EXθ))
for (α( EX), θ, γ ) where γ is void.
The set AS of execution triples is
AS= {switch(xi, xn+i) | 16 i 6 n} ∪ {eval}.
Intuitively, a switch action switch(xi, xn+i ) flips the value of xi from 0 to 1 and the
value from xn+i from 1 to 0. The eval action checks whether for the truth assignment to
x1, . . . , x2n given in the database, there is some positive clause and some negative clause
which are both violated.
For any permutation pi on AS, the actions αpi(j) scheduled before αpi(i) = eval flip the
values of some variables; notice that flipping xi is simultaneously done with flipping xn+i .
The precondition Pre(eval) is true, precisely if there exists some positive clause P and
some negative clause N in I ∪ I ′ which are both violated; this is equivalent to the property
that the current assignment σ stored in D does not satisfy I .
To see this, if P is from I , then I is not satisfied by σ , and if P is from I ′, then there
is a corresponding negative clause N(P) in I such that N(P) is not satisfied. On the other
hand, if σ does not satisfy I , then there exists either a positive clause P ∈ I or a negative
clause N ∈ I which is not satisfied, and thus the corresponding negative clause N(P) ∈ I ′
(respectively, positive clause P(N) ∈ I ′) is not satisfied by σ ; this means Pre(eval) is
true.
Clearly, all actions in AS are executable on the initial database DB, and every feasible
permutation AS[pi] yields the same resulting database. Hence, it follows that AS is F -
concurrently executable, if and only if I is a Yes-Instance. This proves the result.
Note that we can derive AS from a simple fixed program, if we store the pairs xi, xn+i
in a separate relation. The result then immediately extends to the data complexity of a
collection of feasible execution triples. 2
Remark A.1. The F -concurrent execution problem in the above database setting is
polynomial, if the precondition is a conjunction of literals and there are no free (existential)
variables in it. Then, the condition amounts to the following property. Let AS be a set
of action execution triples, and denote by Pre+(α) (respectively, Pre−(α)) the positive
(respectively, negated) ground atoms in the precondition of α. Moreover, let Add ↓ (α) and
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Del ↓ (α) be the ground instances of the atoms inAdd(α) and Del ↓ (α) over the database,
respectively.
(i) Add ↓ (α) ∩ Pre−(β)= ∅, for every α 6= β ∈ AS;
(ii) Del ↓ (α) ∩ (Pre+(β)∪ Add ↓ (β))= ∅, for every α 6= β ∈ AS;
(iii) Add ↓ (α) ∩Del ↓ (α)= ∅, for every α ∈ AS.
(Condition (iii) is actually not needed, but avoids philosophical problems.) An alternative,
less conservative approach would be to limit change by α to the atoms not in Add ↓
(α)∩Del ↓ (α).
Appendix B. Proofs of other results
Proof of Theorem 5.3.
(⇒) Suppose S = lfp(TP,OS ) a rational status set of P on OS . Then, S is feasible by
definition of rational status set. By Lemma 5.2, S is a pre-fixpoint of TP,OS . Since TP,OS
is monotone, it has by the Knaster–Tarski Theorem a least pre-fixpoint, which coincides
with lfp(TP,OS ) (cf. [2,59]). Thus, lfp(TP,OS ) ⊆ S. Clearly, lfp(TP,OS ) satisfies (S1)
and (S3); moreover, lfp(TP,OS ) satisfies (S2), as S satisfies (S2) and this property is
hereditary. By the definition of rational status set, it follows lfp(TP,OS )= S.
(⇐) Suppose S = lfp(TP,OS ) is a feasible status set. Since every status set S′ which
satisfies (S1)–(S3) is a pre-fixpoint of TP,OS and lfp(TP,OS ) is the least prefix point,
S′ ⊆ S implies S = S′. It follows that S is rational.
Proof of Proposition 5.6. In order to show that a reasonable status set S of P is a rational
status of P , we have to verify (1) that S is a feasible status set and (2) that S is grounded.
Since S is a reasonable status set ofP , it is a rational status set ofP ′ = redS(P,OS), i.e.,
a feasible and grounded status set of P ′. Since the conditions (S2)–(S4) of the definition
of feasible status set depend only on S and OS but not on the program, this means that for
showing (1) it remains to check that (S1) (closure under the program rules) is satisfied.
Let thus r be a ground instance of a rule from P . Suppose the body B(r) of r satisfies
the conditions (1)–(4) of (S1). Then, by the definition of redS(P,OS), we have that the
reduct of the rule r , obtained by removing all literals of B−as(r) from the body, is in P ′.
Since S is closed under the rules of P ′, we have H(r) ∈ S. Thus, S is closed under the
rules of P , and hence (S1) is satisfied. As a consequence, (1) holds.
For (2), we suppose S is not grounded, i.e., that some smaller S′ ⊂ S satisfies (S1)–(S3)
for P , and derive a contradiction. If S′ satisfies (S1) for P , then S′ satisfies (S1) for P ′.
For, if r is a rule from P ′ such that (1)–(4) of (S1) hold, then there is a ground rule r ′ of
P such that r is obtained from r ′ in the construction of redS(P,OS) and, as easily seen,
(1)–(4) of (S1) hold. Since S′ satisfies (S1) for P , we have H(r) ∈ S. It follows that S′
satisfies (S1) for P ′. Furthermore, since (S2) and (S3) do no depend on the program, also
(S2) and (S3) are satisfied for S′ with respect to P ′. This means that S is not a rational
status set of P ′, which is the desired contradiction.
Thus, (1) and (2) hold, which proves the result. 2
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Proof of Theorem 5.8. The proof is analogous to the proof of Theorem 5.3; observe that
any status set S′ which satisfies the conditions (S1) and (S3) of A-relativized feasibility,
is a pre-fixpoint of TP,OS ,A. 2
Proof of Theorem 5.9. S is weak rational, if and only if S is A-rational for some A such
that for every A′ 6=A such that A⊆A′, no A′-rational status set exists. This is equivalent
to the fact that A is a maximal set of ground actions such that some A-rational status sets
exist. By Theorem 5.8, a status set S isA-rational iff S = lfp(TP,OS ,A) and S isA-feasible;
the result follows. 2
Proof of Proposition 5.10. Clearly, S is A(S)-feasible. Suppose that A(S) is not the
unique maximal set A such that S is A-feasible. Then, there exists a set A′ 6= A(S) and
a ground action α ∈ A′ \ A(S) such that S is A′-feasible. From the definition of A(S), it
follows Oα ∈ S and Doα /∈ S; since the rule Oα⇒ Doα applies with respect to A′, it
follows Doα ∈ S, which is a contradiction. 2
Proof of Theorem 5.13.
(⇒) If S is weak rational, then (i) follows from Theorem 5.9 and Proposition 5.10.
Suppose for some A′ in (ii), SA′ = lfp(TP,OS ,A′) is A′-feasible. Then, by Theorem 5.8, the
set SA′ is A′-rational, which contradicts that S is a weak rational status set.
(⇐) Suppose (i) and (ii) hold. Then, by Theorem 5.8, S is A-rational. Suppose S is
not a weak rational status set; hence some A′ 6= A exists, A ⊆ A′, for which some A′-
rational status set S′ exists. Since property (S2) of the feasibility condition is hereditary,
it follows from Proposition 5.12 that for every A′′ ⊆A the status set SA′′ = lfp(TP,OS ,A′′)
satisfies (S2). Moreover, SA′′ satisfies (S1) and (S3). Since IC = ∅, we have that SA′′
is A′′-feasible. Let α ∈ A′ \ A and set A′′ = A ∪ {α}. This raises a contradiction to
(ii). Consequently, an A′ as hypothesized does not exist, which proves that S is weak
rational. 2
Proof of Proposition 5.17.
(1) Suppose M is a model of the program P . To show that AM is a feasible status set
of P(P ), we need to show that AM satisfies conditions (S1)–(S4) in the definition of a
feasible status set.
(S1) Suppose r is a ground instance of a rule in AG(P ) whose body is true with respect
to AM . Rule r must be one of the form Pa← Pb1, . . . ,Pbm,¬Pc1, . . . ,Pcm. Then
{P(b1), . . . ,P(bm)} ⊆AM and {P(c1), . . . ,P(cn)} ∩ AM = ∅. By definition ofAM ,
it follows that {a1, . . . , am} ⊆M . By definition ofAM we have {c1, . . . , cn} ∩M =
∅. As M is a model of P , a ∈M , and hence, by definition of AM , P(a) ∈AM .
Thus, AM satisfies condition (S1) in the definition of feasible status set.
(S2) It is easy to see that the conditions defining deontic and action consistency
(Definition 5.2) are satisfied. The reason is that by definition, AM only contains
atoms of the form P(−) and hence, the first two dashes of Definition 5.2 are
immediately true. The third dash of Definition 5.2 is satisfied because all actions in
AG(P ) have an empty precondition, and hence, the consequent of the implication
in the third bullet is immediately true. The action consistency requirement is
satisfied trivially as AG(P ) contains no action constraints.
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(S3) The deontic and action closure requirements stated in Definition 5.3 are trivially
satisfied because AM contains no status atoms of the form O(−) or Do(−).
(S4) As AG(P ) contains no integrity constraints, it follows immediately that the state
consistency requirement is satisfied by AM .
This completes the proof of (1) of the theorem.
(2) Suppose A is a feasible status set of AG(P ) and MA satisfies the body of a ground
instance, r , of a rule in P . Let rule r be of the form
a← b1, . . . , bm,¬c1, . . . ,¬cn.
As {b1, . . . , bm} ⊆ MA, we must, by definition, have {P(b1), . . . ,P(bm)} ⊆ MA. As
{c1, . . . , cn} ∩MA = ∅, we must, by definition, have A ∩ {P(c1), . . . ,P(cn)} = ∅. By
construction of AG(P ), we have the rule
P(a)← P(b1), . . . ,P(bm),¬P(c1), . . . ,¬P(cn)
in AG(P ). As A is a feasible status set, it must satisfy axiom (S1). Hence, P(a) ∈A, which
implies that a ∈MA. This completes the proof. 2
Proof of Proposition 5.19. We show part (1). Part (2) is proved by an analogous
(and somewhat simpler) reasoning. Suppose M is a stable model of P . Then let Q =
redAM (AG(P ),∅) be the agent program obtained as the reduct of AG(P ) with respect to
AM and the empty agent state. To show that AM is a reasonable status set of AG(P ), we
need to show that AM is a rational status set of Q. For this we need to show that each
of conditions (S1)–(S4) is true for AM with respect to Q, and that AM is an inclusion-
minimal set satisfying this condition.
(S1) Consider a rule in Q having a ground instance, r , of the form
P(a)← P(b1), . . . ,P(bm)
such that {P(b1), . . . ,P(bm)} ⊆ AM . By definition, {b1, . . . , bm} ⊆M . As r ∈Q,
there must exist a rule in AG(P ) having a ground instance, r ′, of the form
P(a)← P(b1), . . . ,P(bm),¬P(c1), . . . ,¬P(cn)
such that {P(c1), . . . ,P(cn)} ∩ AM = ∅. This means that there is a rule in P having
a ground instance, r?, of the form
a← b1, . . . , bm,¬c1, . . . ,¬cm
such that {c1, . . . , cn} ∩ M = ∅. Thus as M satisfies the body of r? and as M is a
stable model of P (and hence a model of P ), a ∈M which implies that P(a) ∈AM
and this concludes this part of our proof.
(S2) The first dash in the definition of deontic consistency is immediately satisfied
as AM contains no status atoms of the form W(−). The second dash in the
definition of deontic consistency is immediately satisfied as AM contains no status
atoms of the form F(−). The third dash in the definition of deontic consistency
is immediately satisfied as all actions have an empty precondition, which is
immediately satisfied. The action consistency requirement is immediately satisfied
as the set AC of action constraints produced by AG is empty.
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(S3) AM is deontically closed because, by definition, AM contains no status atoms of
the form O(−). AM is action-closed because AM contains no status atoms of the
form O(−),Do(−).
(S4) AM satisfies the state consistency property because the set IC of integrity
constraints produced by AG is empty.
At this point, we have shown that AM is a feasible status set of Q. To establish that
it is a rational status set of Q, we need to show that it is inclusion-minimal. Suppose
not. Then there exists a set S ⊂ AM such that S is a feasible status set of Q. It is
straightforward to show that S? = P(S) is a stable model of P . But then S? ⊂M , which is
a contradiction, as no stable model of any logic program can be a strict subset of another
stable model [65]. 2
Appendix C. Table of notation used in the paper
In the following tables, all numbers refer to definition numbers, unless explicitly stated
otherwise.
Notation Location Description
S Section 1 beginning Software code
TS Section 1 beginning Set of data types for software code S
FS Section 1 beginning Set of predefined functions for software code S
OS Section 1 beginning Agent state
τ ∈ TS Section 1 beginning Object type
Var(τ ) Section 2.1 beginning Variable symbols ranging over τ
X.fi.g Section 2.1 beginning Path variable
S : f(d1, . . . ,dn) 2.2 Code call
cc 2.2 Code call
in(X,cc) 2.2 Code call atom
<,>,≤,≥,=,& 2.3 Code call condition operators
χ 2.3 Code call condition
Sol(χ)TS ,OS 2.6 Set of code call solutions
O_Sol(χ)TS ,OS 2.6 Set of all objects in a code call solution
insS After 2.6 Inserts objects in a state
delS After 2.6 Deletes objects from a state
ψ⇒ χa 2.7 Integrity constraint
OS |= IC 2.8 Integrity constraint satisfaction
IC 2.8 Finite collection of integrity constraints
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Notation Location Description
α 3.1 Action
(τ1, . . . , τn) 3.1 Action schema
Pre(α) 3.1 Precondition for action α
Add(α) 3.1 Add list for action α
Del(α) 3.1 Delete list for action α
(θ,γ )-executability 3.3 Action execution under substitutions
FE(α( EX),OS ) 3.3 Set of all θ, γ making an action α( EX) executable
apply(A,OS ) 3.5 Weak-concurrent execution
S-concurrently executable 3.6 Sequential-concurrent execution
F -concurrently executable 3.7 Full-concurrent execution
AC 3.8 Action constraint
S,OS |= AC 3.9 Action constraint satisfaction
Pα 3.10 Agent is permitted to take action α
Fα 3.10 Agent is forbidden to take action α
Oα 3.10 Agent is obliged to take action α
Wα 3.10 Obligation to take action α is waived
Doα 3.10 Agent does take action α
A←L1, . . . ,Ln Eq. (3) Action rule
P 3.12 Agent program
H(r) Para before Example 3.7 Head of rule r
B(r) Para before Example 3.7 Body of rule r
B−(r) Para before Example 3.7 Negative literals in the body of rule r
B+(r) Para before Example 3.7 Positive literals in the body of rule r
¬.B−(r) Para before Example 3.7 Atoms of the negative literals of rule r
B(r)as,B(r)cc Para before Example 3.7 Body of rule r restricted to action status atoms
B(r)cc Para before Example 3.7 Body of rule r restricted to code call atoms
B−(r)as Para before Example 3.7 Negative literals in the body of rule r
restricted to action status atoms
B−(r)cc Para before Example 3.7 Negative literals in the body of rule r
restricted to code call atoms
B+(r)as Para before Example 3.7 Positive literals in the body of rule r
restricted to action status atoms
B+(r)cc Para before Example 3.7 Positive literals in the body of rule r
restricted to code call atoms
T. Eiter et al. / Artificial Intelligence 108 (1999) 179–255 251
Notation Location Description
¬.B−(r)as Para before Example 3.7 Negations of atoms in B−(r)as
¬.B−(r)cc Para before Example 3.7 Negations of atoms in B−(r)cc
DCl(S) 5.3 Deontic closure
ACl(S) 5.3 Action closure
AppP,OS (S) 5.4 Application of program rules
TP,OS 5.7 Fixpoint operator
AClA(S) 5.9 Relativized action closure
A-feasible, A-rational, 5.10 Relativized status sets
A-reasonable
TP,OS ,A 5.12 Relativized fixpoint operator
A(S) 5.13
A(S)-feasible 5.10
F -preferred Section 5.6 beginning Preferred set
F/P -completion Section 5.6.2 F/P -completion rule of α
CompF/P (P) Section 5.6.2 beginning Augmentation of P
F/P -complete Section 5.6.2
Sem Section 5.7 Semantics variable
cf 5.15 Cost function
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